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Introduction

Appellants/Defendants Jody Mattena ("Mattena") and May Harris
("Harris") are sisters.

Appellees/Plaintiffs Shellie Biesele ("Biesele") and

Melodie Jacobsen ("Jacobsen") are also sisters. All four have the same father, but
Mattena and Harris have a different mother than Biesele and Jacobsen.
Mattena's and Harris' mother is Royalene Thomas ("Thomas"), whose estate
planning was at issue at trial and in this appeal. Thomas, who is deceased, was
Biesele' s and Jacobsen's stepmother.
In accordance with Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(d), this brief
generally refers to Mattena and Harris as "Mother's Natural-Born Daughters";
Biesele and Jacobsen as "Mother's Stepdaughters"; and Thomas as "Mother".
Mother's Stepdaughters' claims in the underlying action arose from the
disbursement of Mother's estate, specifically a trust (the "Trust") and a Morgan
Stanley IRA account.
Regarding the Trust, Mother's Stepdaughters contended that Mother
lacked capacity to make two amendments to that Trust, and that Mother's
Natural-Born Daughters exerted undue influence and duress on Mother to make
those amendments. Mother's Natural-Born Daughters alleged that Mother was
competent to sign the Trust amendments and that she was not under any undue
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influence or duress when she signed them.

Mother's Stepdaughters further

alleged breaches of fiduciary duty by Mother's Natural-Born Daughters in their
roles as co-successor trustees for that Trust, fraud, conspiracy to commit fraud,
and other tort claims.
Mother's Stepdaughters' claims arising under the Morgan Stanley IRA
account grew out of language Thomas used in her IRA Participant Application
[Record ("R.") 2740, Trial Exhibits ("Tr. Exs.) 8 and 240], under her designation of
"contingent beneficiary" that she wanted the Morgan Stanley IRA account
proceeds to pass to her "children equally."
The trial started on May 1, 2017 [R.2082], and ended five days later, on
May 5, 2017. In its Special Verdict the jury awarded compensatory and punitive
damages against Mother's Natural-Born Daughters.
The overriding issue in this appeal is whether UTAH CODE sections 78B-8201 et seq. and governing case law require a bifurcated trial in which evidence of
a defendant's financial condition is introduced (a) only after the jury finds the
defendant liable for punitive damages, and (b) before the jury assesses them.
The district court refused to bifurcate those deliberations and erroneously
allowed the jury to make a determination of both liability for, and the amount of,

-2-
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punitive damages, at the same time on the same Special Verdict [R.2735-2379

~

(Addendum(" Add.") A)].
This appeal also presents other punitive damages issues, including (a)
whose burden it is to put on evidence of the defendant's financial condition, and
(b) which damages are properly included in the denominator of the punitive
damages calculation. Even though the relevant jury instruction (No. 44 [Tr. Ex.
44 (Add. C)] placed the burden of introducing evidence of financial condition on
Mother's Stepdaughters, the trial ignored that jury instruction when it assigned
that burden to Mother's Natural-Born Children, Mattena and Harris. In addition
to improperly refusing bifurcation, the district court committed both legal and
mathematical error in calculating the ratio of punitive to actual damages.
Properly calculated, the ratio applicable to Mattena is over 4:1, which is
presumptively excessive under Utah law.
The final question in this appeal concerns the doctrine of joint and several
liability and the district court's mathematical error in its January 5, 2018
Judgment [R.3196-3203 (Add. E)]. Even though Utah has abolished joint-andseveral liability the district court imposed it twice over defendants Ma ttena' s and
Harris' repeated objections. In the first instance, the jury awarded Mother's
Stepdaughters $197,064.54 growing out of the Morgan Stanley IRA. Mother's

-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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<i

Stepdaughters had the burden of introducing evidence allowing the jury to
apportion that award between the defendants, Mother's Natural-Born Children
Mattena and Harris but failed to introduce that evidence.
Despite this failure and the abolition of joint-and-several liability, the
district court entered judgment for the entire $197,064.54 against defendant
Mattena, and judgment for the entire $197,064.54 also against defendant Harris.
The district court also awarded interest on the entire amount against each
defendant.
In the second instance the district court also entered judgment over their
repeated objections against Mattena and Harris for the district court's entire
$150,332.00 attorney-fee award, again imposing joint-and-several liability on
defendants Mattena and Harris.
Utah statutes and common law establish that as a result of these district
court errors, this Court should vacate (a) the jury's punitive damage awards
against Mother's Natural-Born Daughters, (b) the jury's joint and several
compensatory damages award in favor of Mother's Stepdaughters growing out
of the Morgan Stanley IRA, and (c) the district court's joint-and-several attorney
fee award against both of Mother's Natural-Born Daughters.
(it)

-4-
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Statement of the Issues
Issue No. 1: Whether the district court committed reversible error in

denying Mother's Natural-Born Daughters' request to present evidence of their
financial condition (a) after the jury found liability for punitive damages, but (b)
before assessing those damages.
Standard of Review:

This Court "review[s] questions of statutory

interpretation for correctness, affording no deference to the district court's legal
conclusions." Bank of America v. Adamson, 2017 UT 2,

il 9, 391 P.3d 196); see also,

Utah Dept. of Transp. v. FPA West Point, LLC, 2012 UT 79,

il 9, 304 P.3d 810 ("We

review questions of statutory interpretation for correctness. Similarly, a lower
court's interpretation of binding case law presents a question of law which we
review for correctness.") (citations and internal punctuation omitted).
Preservation: This issue is preserved. [R.2816-2826; 2936-2960; 3020-3030;
~

3132-3133]
Issue No. 2: Whether the district court committed reversible error in

concluding that Mattena had the burden of presenting evidence of her financial
condition.
Standard of Review: Burden of proof questions "typically present issues

of law that an appellate court reviews for correctness."); Essential Botanical Farms,

-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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LC v. Kay, 2011 UT 71,

,r

12, 270 P.3d 430; Martinez v. Media-Paymaster

Plus/Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 2007 UT 42,

,r 41, 164 P.3d 384.

Preservation: This issue is preserved. [R.3081-3094]
Issue No. 3: Whether the district court committed reversible error in

refusing to strike the jury's punitive damages award as presumptively excessive.
Standard of Review: This Court "review[s] questions of statutory

interpretation for correctness, affording no deference to the district court's legal
@i)

conclusions." Bank of America v. Adamson, 2017 UT 2,

,r 9,391 P.3d 196); see also,

Utah Dept. of Transp. v. FPA West Point, LLC, 2012 UT 79,

,r 9, 304 P.3d 810 ("We

review questions of statutory interpretation for correctness. Similarly, a lower
court's interpretation of binding case law presents a question of law which we
review for correctness.") (citations and internal punctuation omitted)
Preservation: This issue is preserved. [R. 2816-2826; 2936-2960; 3081-3094]
Issue No. 4:

Whether the district court committed reversible error in

making some awards joint and several.
Standard of Review: This Court "review[s] questions of statutory

interpretation for correctness, affording no deference to the district court's legal
conclusions." Bank of America v. Adamson, 2017 UT 2,

,r 9, 391 P.3d 196); see also,

Utah Dept. of Transp. v. FPA West Point, LLC, 2012 UT 79,

-6-
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review questions of statutory interpretation for correctness.

Similarly, a lower

court's interpretation of binding case law presents a question of law which we
review for correctness.") (citations and internal punctuation omitted)
Preservation: This issue is preserved. [R.02817-02819, 02822-02823, 02956,

03082-03085,03087-03093;3219-3248;3332-3380;3409-3415]
Statement of the Case

Mother's Stepdaughters filed their Complaint against Mother's NaturalBorn Daughters on April 23, 2014 [R.1-19]. Mother's Stepdaughters contended
that Mother lacked capacity to make two amendments to the Trust, and that
Mother's Natural-Born Daughters exerted undue influence on Mother to make
those amendments. Mother's Natural-Born Daughters contended that Mother

•

was competent to sign the Trust amendments and that Mother was not under
any undue influence when she signed them.
On August 18, 2015 Mother's Stepdaughters filed their Amended
Complaint adding claims under the Morgan Stanley IRA.

Mother's

Stepdaughters' claims arising under the Morgan Stanley IRA grew out of
language Mother used in a written beneficiary-designation form [Tr. Exs. 8 and
240 (Add. B)] that she wanted the Morgan Stanley IRA proceeds to pass to her
"children [whom she defined as her 'daughters'] equally".

-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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•

On March 23, 2016 Mother's Stepdaughters filed their Motion For Leave to
File Second Amended Complaint and Memorandum In Support [R.789-814], in
Ci)

which they "maintain[ed] they were legally adopted by Royalene Thomas and
wish[ed] to amend their Complaint to state they were Royalene's daughters."
Mother's Natural-born Daughters opposed that motion.

The district court

denied Mother's Stepdaughters' motion because Mother's Stepdaughters "have
not presented any document reflecting their adoption, from the court or
Qi>

otherwise." [R.959]
On March 31, 2017 Mother's Natural-born Daughters filed a motion in
11

limine [R.2287-2290] requesting an order barring any evidence to the effect that
Shellie Biesele and Melodie Jacobsen . . . were adopted by Royalene Thomas".
On April 14, 2017 Mother's Stepdaughters objected on the grounds that:
"Plaintiffs do not have any order or document evidencing adoption. They have a
recollection of attending a· court hearing where they recall it was about Royalene
Thomas ("Royalene") taking care of them. They may testify as to this recollection
to help establish their contention that Royalene considered them her children."
[R.2430-2432]

The district court denied the motion in Ii.mine because it

concluded that Mother's intentions and the meaning of her beneficiary
designation in the Morgan Stanley IRA presented triable issues of fact. [R.2444]

~

-8-
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Mother's Stepdaughters claimed at trial that Mother meant to include
them within the meaning of the word "children" and that that Mother
considered them to be her "children" Mother's Natural-Born Daughters argued
at trial that by using the word "children", Mother intended to include only her
natural-born children and did not intend to include stepchildren.
At the close of Mother's Stepdaughters' case on May 4, 2017, Mother's
Natural-Born Daughters moved for a directed verdict, which the district court
denied except for dismissing (a) Plaintiffs' constructive trust and conspiracy to
commit fraud claims against both Defendants and (b) the fraud claim against
Mother's Natural-Born Daughter Harris. [R.2673]
The jury found at trial that Mother did intend to include her two
Stepchildren within the definition of "children", and awarded both of Mother's
Stepdaughters the single amount of $197,064.54 in compensatory damages
arising from the Morgan Stanley IRA. [R.2737 (Add. A)]
The jury also awarded each of Mother's Stepdaughters $38,235.88 in
compensatory damages growing out of the Trust against Mattena, and $17,509.58
in compensatory damages growing out of the Trust against Harris.

[R.2739

(Add. A)] Stated differently, the jury assessed $76,471.76 in compensatory

-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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®

damages against Mattena, and $35,019.16 in compensatory damages against
Harris, relating to the Trust. [R.2739].
Mother's Stepdaughters also sought punitive damages. Mother's NaturalBorn Daughters demanded that the district court conduct the bifurcated
procedure for assessing punitive damages that UTAH CODE section 78B-8-201 and
Utah common law mandate. [R.2952-2953, 2957, 3038-3039] The district court
refused to conduct the bifurcated proceeding and permitted the jury to assess
•

punitive damages without having received any instruction on the calculation of
punitive damages or about the financial condition of Mother's Natural-Born
Daughters.

[R.2957, 3038-3039].

Proceeding without instruction on the

assessment of punitive damages, the jury assessed punitive damages of
$308,555.46 against Mattena and the same amount against Harris. [R. 2739 (Add.

A}]
Immediately after trial Mother's Stepdaughters sought attorney fees an~
costs [R.2743-2803] and submitted a proposed Order and Judgment [R.28622865]. Mother's Natural-Born Daughters opposed that motion and the proposed
Order. [R.2816-2826; 2829-2849].
On July 31, 2017 Mother's Natural-Born Daughters filed a Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict on the issues of punitive damages and

- 10 -
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joint and several liability on July 31, 2017. [R.2936-2960]. The district court heard
those pending motions on September 19, 2017 [R.3033-3034] and entered its
Memorandum Decision {R.3035-3049 (Add. D)] on November 17, 2017. In its
Memorandum Decision the district court denied Mother's Natural-Born
Daughters' motion, and granted in part and denied in part Mother's
Stepdaughters' motion and proposed Order and Judgment. [R.3035-3049 (Add.

D)].
The district court entered its Order and Judgment on January 5, 2018.
[R.3196-3203]. The day before, on January 4, 2018 Mattena filed a voluntary
petition for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennessee (the
"Bankruptcy"). [R.3699-3700]
The district court entered its final judgment on March 9, 2018. [R.34923496 (Add. F)] Mother's Natural Daughter Mattena filed her Notice of Appeal
[R.3532-3534] on March 19, 2018. This is Mattena' s brief.
Summary of the Argument

The district court erred by failing to grant Mattena's request to present
evidence of her financial condition after the jury found her liable for punitive
damages, but before assessing those damages against her. In accordance with

- 11 -
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Utah statutory and common law, Mattena asked the district court to follow the
legally required bifurcated process to ensure that her financial condition was
admitted into evidence only after the jury found her liable for punitive damages.
As a result of the district court's direction to the jury that it find Mattena liable
for punitive damages without any evidence of her financial condition, Mattena
was forced to file Bankruptcy, the very consequence that the requested
bifurcation procedure was designed to eliminate.
The district court erred by assigning to Mattena, rather than the Mother's
Stepdaughters, the burden of presenting evidence of Mattena's financial
condition. The Mother's Stepdaughters' proposed jury instruction included a
paragraph that properly assigned to them the burden of proving their punitive
damages claim. This paragraph formed part of the punitive damages instruction
given by the district court. Although it was the Mother's Stepdaughters' burden
to present evidence of Mattena' s financial condition, and not Mattena' s burden,
the Mother's Stepdaughters presented no evidence of Mattena' s financial
condition.
The district court erred by refusing to strike the jury's punitive damages
award against Mattena as presumptively excessive and by concluding that the
jury's $197,064.54 compensatory damages award to Mother's Stepdaughters

- 12 -

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

growing out of the Morgan Stanley IRA should be included in the calculation of
the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages, even though that IRA
liability resulted from the jury's determination of the meaning of the IRA
documents.

The jury awarded punitive damages of $305,855.46 and

compensatory damages of $76,471.60 against Mattena and the resulting ratio of
4:1 is presumptively excessive under Utah common law. The $197,064.54 in
compensatory damages awarded to the Mother's Stepdaughters was improperly
included in the punitive damages calculation, because the jury's resolution of an
ambiguous contractual provision in the Morgan Stanley IRA documents did not
entitle them to punitive damages under UTAH CODE section 78B-8-201(1)(a).
The district court erred in denying Mattena' s request to allocate fault
between Mother's Natural-Born Children, since it resulted in the imposition of
joint and several liability on Mattena for compensatory damages and attorney
fees. Because of the abolition of joint and several liability, the district court was
required to apportion fault between the Mother's Natural-Born Daughters within
the meaning of UTAH CODE section 78B-5-818(4)(a). The Mother's Stepdaughters
failed to carry their burden to present evidence of the facts necessary to allocate
these damages.

- 13 -
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Argument
1.

The District Court Committed Reversible Error in Refusing to Bifurcate
the Trial.
The

district court's

November 17, 2017

Memorandum Decision

summarizes Mother's Natural-Born Daughters' contention and the district
court's legal ruling on the issue of bifurcating the trial so that they could put on
evidence of their financial conditions after the jury entered their verdict on
liability for punitive damages but before the jury assessed the amount of
punitive damages:
Defendants contend that the court erred when it refused to bifurcate
the question of the amount of punitive damages. They assert that
Utah Code section 78B-8-201(2) mandates bifurcation of the amount
of punitive damages from the other issues at trial. Specifically, they
argue that a jury must consider the financial condition of the
defendants when determining the amount of punitive damages and
that under section 78B-8-201 evidence of financial condition can only
be presented in a bifurcated proceeding. The Court disagrees.
Section 78B-8-201 states that evidence "of a party's wealth of
financial condition shall be admissible only after a finding of liability
for punitive damages has been made." It thus requires bifurcation
when any party intends to put on evidence of a party's financial
condition as part of its claim or defense on the amount of punitive
damages. But neither section 201 nor Utah case law require the jury
to consider evidence of financial condition in making a punitive
damages award. In fact, the case law states the opposite. [R.3037
(Add. D)]

- 14 -
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Consistent with Utah statutory and common law, the special verdict form
that Mother's Natural-Born Daughters Mattena and Harris jointly submitted
[R.2467-2476] had no space for punitive damages. Also consistent with that law,
their counsel asked the district court to follow the legally required bifurcated
process whereby evidence of their respective financial conditions could be
admitted only after the jury found them liable for punitive damages.
The district court denied that request based on its contrary reading of the
statute {R.3037-3038 (Add. D)], and instead directed the jury to award punitive
damages at the same time that they found Mother's Natural-Born Daughters
Mattena and Harris liable for punitive damages without any evidence of their
respective financial conditions as Utah law requires. As a result of the procedure
the district court followed, Mattena was forced to file a petition for Chapter 7
bankruptcy protection (the "Bankruptcy") [R.3699-3700], the very result that the
requested bifurcated procedure could have eliminated.

- 15 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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UTAH CODE section 78B-8-201 reads, in pertinent part:
(l)(A) Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive damages
may be awarded only if compensatory or general damages are
awarded and it is established by clear and convincing evidence that
the acts or omissions of the tortfeasorl11 are the result of willful and
malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that
manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a
disregard of, the rights of others ....
(2) Evidence of a party's wealth or financial condition shall be
admissible only after a finding of liability for punitive damages has
been made.
This language has remained unchanged since the Utah Legislature originally
enacted the punitive damages statute (L. Utah 1989, ch. 237, Sec. (l)(a) and (2)) in
1989.
Shortly after the statute's enactment, this Court explained in Crookston v.

Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 807, n. 23 (Utah 1991) ("Crookston I") the
procedure for determining punitive damages: "Under the statute, evidence of a
defendant's wealth would be admissible only after the jury had properly
determined that an award of punitive damages was proper." This is not a
complicated or ambiguous statute, and Crookston I is not a complicated decision:
"Only" excludes any other possibility. See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 982 (5th

- 16 -

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ed.1979) (defining "only" as "Solely; merely; for no other purpose; in no
otherwise; along; of or by itself; without anything more; exclusive; nothing else
or more."). "After" means "later, succeeding, subsequent to ... ". Black's Law

Dictionary 57 (5th ed.1979).
Mother's Natural-Born Daughter Mattena could properly offer evidence of
her financial resources "only after" the jury found Mattena liable for punitive
damages, not before.

Cf. State v. George, 48 So.2d 265, 271 (La. 1950) ("The

provision in the act that it may be invoked only after conviction means that the
guilt or innocence has theretofore been determined in a felony case by the jury
before whom the accused was tried."
Mother's Stepdaughters themselves recognized this procedure in their
Complaint, where they pleaded: "In the event it is found by the jury or the Court
that the actions undertaken by the Defendants were done intentionally and with
malice of heart, the Court should hold a hearing on punitive damages against
Defendants pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-8-201." [R.17]

1

By using the word· "tortfeasor" in section 78B-8-201, the Utah Legislature
expressly excluded contractual breaches from punitive damages awards.
Mattena discusses this issue further in Point 3.2.1 of this brief.
- 17 -
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Finally, Committee Note 4 to Model Utah Jury Instruction ("MUJI") 2d
CV2026 (Add. G) reads:
The statute requires bifurcation in all cases where punitive damages
are sought at trial and evidence of wealth is introduced. The first
phase will resolve the question of whether the plaintiff is entitled to
punitive damages for the conduct alleged. If the jury determines
that the plaintiff is so entitled, there will be a second phase. The
second phase 1nay include evidence of the defendant's wealth or
financial condition (Section 78B-8-201(2)), with the jury answering
only the question of what amount of punitive damages to award.
MUJI Instruction CV2027(Add. G) 2 complements and implements
MUJI Instruction CV2026 and its comment 4:

In accordance with UTAH RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 7(i), on December 13, 2017
Defendants called MUJI 2d CV2027 to the trial court's attention after issuance of
the November 30, 2017 Utah Court of Appeals opinion in Larsen v. Davis County
Sch. Dist., 2017 UT App 221,409 P.3d 114, cert. denied, 421 P.3d 441 (Utah, May 07,
2018), which, at paragraph 18, held that MUJI jury instructions provide "plain
guidance" to Utah courts on legal issues. Based on the authority of Larsen,
Defendants asked the trial court to apply the authority and language of MUJI 2d
CV2027 to all non-final orders and pending motions in this case. Defendants
could not properly argue that MUJI 2d CV2027 was an authoritative statement of
the law because before Larsen, Utah appellate opinions had repeatedly held that
trial courts are not bound by jury instructions. See, e.g., Jones v. Cyprus Plateau
Min. Corp., 944 P.2d 357, 359 (Utah 1997) ("MUJI are merely advisory and do not
necessarily represent correct statements of Utah law."); State v. Lewis, 2014 UT
App 241, ,r12, n.9, 337 P.3d 1053 ("the model instructions, taken alone, are merely
advisory and do not necessarily represent correct statements of Utah law.")
(citation and internal punctuation omitted). Even though it is not necessary for
the resolution of her appeal, Mattena respectfully suggests that this Court take
this opportunity to reconcile the apparent tension between (i) the court of
appeals' opinion in Larsen, on which this Court has denied certiorari, and (ii) the
contrary opinions of both this Court and the court of appeals.

2

•

@>

•

(j
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Now that you have decided to award punitive damages, you must
determine the amount. Punitive damages should be the amount
necessary to fulfill the two purposes of punitive damages: to punish
past misconduct and to discourage future misconduct. Your decision
should not be arbitrary. The amount must be reasonable and bear
some relationship to [name of plaintiff]'s harm. Whether or not to
award a specific amount or any amount of punitive damages is left
entirely up to you.
MUJI Instructions CV2026 and CV2027 are separated for a purpose. A
district court is to give MUJI Instruction CV2026 or an equivalent instruction
before the jury retires. Trial courts are to give MUJI Instructions CV2027 through
CV2031 (Add. G) or an equivalent instructions only after a jury has, in the words
of Comment 4 to MUJI Instruction CV2026 "resolve[d] the question of whether
the plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages for the conduct alleged".

Here,

however, notwithstanding Mother's Natural-Born Daughters' objection, the
district court gave Jury Instruction 44 [R.2729], which conflated MUJI
Instructions . CV2026 and CV2027, and deprived Mother's Natural-Born
Daughters of their right to the bifurcated proceeding to which UTAH CODE
section 78B-8-201 and controlling common law entitled Mother's Natural-Born
Daughters.
Consistent with UTAH CODE section 78B-8-201 and common law applying
that statute, MUJI Instructions CV2026 and CV2027 expressly provide that the

- 19 -
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•

Court cannot permit a jury to determine the amount of punitive _damages unless
and until the jury has first returned a verdict finding that a defendant is subject
•

to a punitive damages award. MUJI Instructions CV2026 and CV2027 together
provided further authority that the district court should not have permitted the
jury to determine the amount of punitive damages in the same deliberation and

t)

at the same time that it found Mother's Natural-Born Daughters liable for
punitive damages.
By denying Mother's Natural-Born Daughters' demand for the bifurcated
proceeding to which Utah law entitled them, the district court prevented the jury
from considering the seven factors that the jury was required to consider, one of
which is the relative wealth of defendants.

Diversified Holdings v. Turner, 2002 UT 129,

,r

Crookston I. at p. 808; see also,
12 & n.5, 63 P .3d 686 (" A jury,

district court, or appellate court must consider (i) the relative wealth of the
defendant; ... While these factors do not comprise an exclusive list, nor carry
decisive weight individually, all factors must be considered").

The district

court's denial of the bifurcated proceeding that Mother's Natural-Born
Daughters requested and that Mother's Stepdaughters described in their
Complaint deprived Mother's Natural-Born Daughters of the opportunity to
Ci

have the jury consider evidence of their financial resources and condition.

- 20 -
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Consistent with section 78B-8-201, Crookston I, and the principles contained
in MUJI Instructions CV2026 and CV2027, the special verdict form that Mother's
Natural-Born Daughters jointly submitted [R.2467-2476] had no space for
punitive damages because the 1ury was not properly instructed on the
assessment of punitive damages until after it found either or both of the Mother's
Natural-Born Daughters liable for punitive damages. Their counsel requested a
bifurcated process that would have allowed evidence of Mother's Natural-Born
Daughters Mattena's and Harris' respective wealth only if and after the jury
found punitive damages appropriate. The court denied that request based on its
contrary reading of the statute, and instead used a special verdict form [R.27352739 (Add. A)] that contained a space (il 15) for the jury to assess punitive
damages at the same time that it found Mother's Natural-Born Daughters liable
for them (if 14), contrary to Utah law.
Applying section 78B-8-201(2), a federal judge described and ordered the
very bifurcated procedure that Mother's Natural-Born Daughters in this case
requested:
[T]he Court finds that punitive damages may be awarded against
[two defendants]. However, there has been insufficient evidence
produced to this point as to the appropriate amount of any such
damages or the Defendants' ability to pay. Accordingly, pursuant to

- 21 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(b)[31, the Court exercises its discretion and elects to
allow the Plaintiff to present evidence on these issues only at a
continued hearing on the trial.

In re Fabbro, 411 B.R. 407, 427 (Bankr. D. Utah 2009). It is notable that the Fabbro
court exercised its discretion to permit the plaintiff - not the defendants - to
present that evidence. The discretion the Fabbro court exercised was between (i)
awarding the plaintiff no punitive damages or (ii) giving the plaintiff the
opportunity to present evidence of the defendants' wealth: "Plaintiff is allowed
30 days from the date of these Findings and Conclusions to request a hearing on
punitive damages and to file any additional briefing on this cause of action only.
Failure to timely request and set the hearing shall be a bar to any award of
punitive damages." Id. at 427. Fabbro is thus consistent with the argument that
Mother 1s Natural-Born Daughters make in Point 2 of this brief that under Utah
law Mother's Stepdaughters, not Mother's Natural-Born Daughters, had the
burden of introducing evidence of Mother's Natural-Born Daughters' financial
conditions, and that the absence of evidence of Mother's Natural-Born
Daughters' respective wealth dooms the jury's punitive damages awards against
Mother's Natural-Born Daughters Mattena and Harris.

FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 42(b) and UTAH RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
42(b) are functionally identical except the Federal rule expressly preserves the

3
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The bifurcated procedure is critical because punitive damages have
nothing to do with compensating a plaintiff for his or her loss. Instead, the focus
is on the particular defendant and the consequences of a punitive damages
award on that defendant:
Although the level of compensatory damages is determined with
reference to the plaintiff's loss; the amount of a punitive damage
award is decided with regard to punishing and deterring the
defendant. The ratio of punitive to actual damages[41 is useful in
determining the appropriateness of an award of punitive damages
not because the adequacy of a plaintiff's compensation is at issue in
assessing the appropriateness of an award of punitive damages, but
because the amount of the loss suffered by a plaintiff is of some use
in gauging the degree of reprehensibility associated with a
defendant's conduct.

Diversified Holdings, 2002 UT 129, if 26 n.14. In enacting the punitive damages
statute in 1989, the Utah Legislature recognized that "allowing plaintiffs a
windfall runs counter to the concept of punitive damages."

Kia Hodgson,

Comment, Punitive Damages Act, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 269,274 & n.47 (1990), so any
focus on the plaintiffs is improper in a punitive damages analysis. ·

right to a jury trial in the bifurcated proceeding, while the Utah rule does not.
Mother's Natural-Born Daughter Mattena also contends in this appeal that
irrespective of the Court's resolution of the bifurcation issue, this Court should
still reverse the punitive damages award against Mattena because the ratio of
punitive to actual damages is greater than Utah and Federal law allow. Mattena
discusses this issue further in Point 3 of this brief.

4
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Because punitive damages exist solely to punish a defendant, "a
defendant's wealth can be either an aggravating or a mitigating factor in
determining the size of a punitive damage award, since punitive damages
should be tailored to what is necessary to deter the particular defendant, ... " See

Diversified Holdings, 2002 UT 129, ,r 15.
These aggravating and mitigating factors explain why the statute
absolutely prohibits evidence of a defendant's financial resources until "after a
finding of liability for punitive damages". In the case of a wealthy defendant, it
prevents the jury from awarding punitive damages merely because the
defendant is rich. See Note, Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange and the Utah

Punitive Damage Act: Toward a Sounder Law Of Punitive Damages?, 1993 Utah L.
Rev. 513, 531 ("'The legislature feared that absent such a rule, a jury might be
inclined to find a reason for imposing punitive damages based on its
examination of a defendant's assets. By prohibiting the introduction of evidence
of a defendant's wealth until a sufficient showing of liability has been made, the
trier of fact is forced to focus on the defendant's conduct rather than wealth.")
On the other hand, the opportunity for a poor defendant to put on
evidence of his/her meager assets prevents the socially useless exercise of
"punishing" a defendant into bankruptcy. See, e.g., Diversified Holdings, 2002 UT
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129, ,I 15 (" the trial court intended "to send a very strong message regarding
future conduct" without putting Knapp at risk of bankruptcy"); Hall v. Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc., 959 P.2d 109, 112 (Utah 1998) ("The defendant who cannot pay a large
award of punitive damages can point this out to the jury so that they will not
waste their time and that of the bankruptcy courts by awarding an amount that
exceeds his ability to pay."); (Crookston I, 817 P.2d at pp. 811-812) ("Factors that
may justify a remittitur could include the fact that the award exceeded the
proper ratio ... or a substantial risk of bankrupting the defendant."); see also,

Kenly v. Ukegawa, 16 Cal.App.4th 49, 57 (1993) ("The purpose underlying the
financial component is to assure that the award punishes but does not cripple or
bankrupt the defendant."); Lipsig v. Ramlawi, 760 So.2d 170, 188 (Fla. Ct. App.
2000) ("While a punitive damage award should be painful enough to provide
some retribution and deterrence, it should not be an amount which will
financially destroy or bankrupt a defendant."); S.J. Amoroso Constr. Co. v. Lazovich
& Lazovich, 810 P2d 775, 778 (Nev. 1991) ("punitive damage awards are intended

to punish not to destroy.")
To avoid this result, the jury is entitled to hear before assessing punitive
damages "evidence of [a defendant's] inability to pay a large award of punitive
damages." Hall, 959 P.2d at p. 113. A jury can properly hear this evidence,
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11

however, only after the jury had properly determined that an award of punitive
damages was proper." Crookston I, 817 P.2d at p. 807, n. 23. This is the procedure
et

that Mother's Natural-Born Daughters asked the district court follow as well as
the one that Mother's Stepdaughters described in their Complaint, but the
district court declined and refused to follow it.

In doing so, the Court

improperly prevented the jury from hearing and considering any evidence of
Mother's Natural-Born Daughter Mattena's financial resources in the manner
~

and at the time that section 78B-8-201 and Utah common law require.
In Wachocki v. Luna, 2014 UT App 139,

,r

20, 330 P.3d 717, appellants

II

argued that the trial court did not really consider the financial wealth" of each
defendant" as Crookston I required.

In vacating the trial court's punitive

damages award, Judge
(now Justice)
John A.
.
.
. Pearce explained the error that the
.

,'

district court in this case made that was so prejudicial to Mother's Natural-Born
Daughter Mattena, resulting in her filing her Bankruptcy petition:
[T]he district court has an obligation to assess the relative wealth of
each defendant individually, as the award needed to deter one
defendant from future misconduct may differ from that needed to
deter another. Similarly, given the constitutional considerations of
an excessive punitive damages award, see Westgate Resorts, Ltd. v.
Consumer Prat. Grp., LLC, 2012 UT 55, ,r 10,285 P.3d 1219, an award
that can be constitutionally imposed against one defendant may fail
constitutional muster when imposed against another.
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Wachocki v. Luna, 2014 UT App,

,r

26. The Wachocki court vacated the punitive

damages award in that case in part because "the district court failed to properly
assess the individual wealth of each defendant." Id.
Section 78B-8-201 and Utah common law guaranteed Mother's NaturalBorn Daughter Mattena the right to have the jury consider evidence of Mattena' s
financial resources before the jury assessed punitive damages against her.
Mother's Natural-Born Daughter Mattena timely requested this bifurcated
procedure. The district court denied that procedure, causing Mattena to file the
very Bankruptcy that the procedure was designed to prevent. This Court should
vacate the punitive damages award against Mattena.
2.

The District Court Committed Reversible Error In Imposing on Mattena
the Burden of Presenting Evidence of Her Financial Condition.

Mother's Natural-Born Children objected to Jury Instruction 44 [R.2729
(Add. C)] only to the extent its final paragraph subverted the required
bifurcation procedure described in the preceding point. They did not object to
the first three paragraphs of Jury Instruction 44, which were generally consistent
with MUJI Instruction CV2026 and accurately described the requirements to find
a defendant liable for punitive damages.
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As pertinent to this appeal, Jury Instruction 44 properly assigned to
Mother's Stepdaughters the burden of proving their punitive damages claim:
€®

"Shellie Biesele and Melodie Jacobsen have the burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence that punitive damages should be awarded and, if so, the
amount of any such damages."

This language is verbatim from Mother's

Stepdaughters' proposed jury instruction on punitive damages. [R.2542]
Jury Instruction 44 and Mother's Stepdaughters' own proposed jury
instruction thus correctly assigned the burden of proving punitive damages to
Mother's Stepdaughters. At trial, neither Mother's Stepdaughters nor Mother's
Natural-Born Daughters presented evidence of Mother's Natural-Born Daughter
Mattena's financial condition. There was no reason for Mattena to do so because
Jury Instruction 44 assigned that burden to Mother's Stepdaughters.
Later, however, in denying Mother's Natural-Born Daughters' Motion For
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict Regarding Punitive Damages under
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 59(a)(5)-(7), the district court ignored its own

jury instruction and instead assigned the burden of presenting evidence of their
financial condition to Mother's Natural-Born Daughters:
Defendants never proffered evidence of their financial condition or
argued that bifurcation was necessary to present that evidence.
Parties cannot make motions or objections on one ground and then
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argue other grounds in post-trial motions or on appeal. Because
Defendants never alerted the Court to their desire to introduce
evidence of their financial condition, the Court did not err in
refusing to bifurcate the case. [R.3039 (Add. D) (citation omitted)]
The district court thus refused to conduct the bifurcated proceeding
described in the immediately preceding section of this brief at least in part
because the district court- contrary to Jury Instruction 44 - erroneously assigned
to Mother's Natural-Born Daughters the burden of presenting evidence of their
financial condition.
The district court described Mother's Natural-Born Daughters' demand for
bifurcation: "[W]hen defense counsel requested bifurcation, he erroneously
argued that bifurcation was mandatory in every instance in which punitive
damages were claimed.,., [R. 3038 (Add. D)] It was not Mother's Natural-Born
Daughters' counsel who was in error, however, on the bifurcati~n demand. It
was the district court that was in error in rejecting that demand.
Mother's Natural-Born Daughters did not demand their right to
bifurcation so that they could meet any burden. Jury Instruction 44 correctly
assigned the burden of proving punitive damages to Mother's Stepdaughters.
Instead, Mother's Natural-Born Daughters demanded their right to bifurcation
so they would be able to rebut any evidence that Mother's Stepdaughters might

®
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introduce or argument that Mother's Stepdaughters might make in their effort to
meet their burden of proof regarding the appropriate level of punitive damages
after the jury found either or both of Mother's Natural-Born Daughters liable for
punitive damages.

As it turned out, Mother's Stepdaughters introduced no

evidence of Mother's Natural-Born Daughter Mattena' s financial condition at
I)

trial and there was therefore no need for her to present any rebuttal evidence or
argument in the second stage of the bifurcated proceeding because, by failing to
introduce that evidence, Mother's Stepdaughters waived their punitive damages
claims.
The district court thus imposed on Mother's Natural-Born Daughter
Mattena the burden of introducing - during the trial itself and before the jury
found her liable for punitive damages - evidence of Mattena's financial
condition.

Because Mattena did not introduce that evidence before the jury

found her liable for punitive damages, the district court allowed the jury to
assess punitive damages without any evidence of Mattena' s net worth or income:
"[N]obody' s raised the wealth of the parties, the respective wealth of the parties
in this issue. So under the statute, I believe the jury just decides the issue as a

question, so .... " [R.3038 (Add. D)] The district court committed legal error
when, contrary to its own Jury Instruction 44, it (a) assigned the burden to
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Mother's Natural-Born Daughter Mattena rather than to Mother's Stepdaughters
and (b) permitted the jury to assess punitive damages without any instruction on
either (i) the criteria for punitive damages (MUJI Instructions CV2028-CV2032) or
(ii) Mattena's financial condition.
Jury Instruction 44 correctly assigned to Mother's Stepdaughters the
burden of proof of the amount of punitive damages. In Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669
P.2d 1207, 1219 (Utah 1983) this Court reversed a punitive damages award
"because it was entered without adducing any evidence or making any findings
of fact regarding defendant's net worth or income." A year later, in Bundy v.

Century Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754, 7~9 (Utah 1984), this Court similarly wrote
that "the record is devoid of any evidence regarding defendant's assets or net
worth. Thus, it is evident that neither the jury nor the trial judge considered this
factor in establishing the award for punitive damages. This Court has held that
in the absence of such evidence the award cannot be sustained."
In Hall, 959 P.2d at 112-113 this Court cautioned that "the plaintiff who
fails to introduce evidence of the defendant's relative wealth risks having an
award struck down on the basis of excessiveness." Although this Court did not
apply that rule in Hall, that was because the defendant, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., did
not claim that the punitive damages awarded there were excessive: "Wal-Mart
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does not contend that the punitive damages award was excessive. Rather, it
contends only that the introduction of evidence as to the relative wealth of the
defendant is a technical prerequisite to an award of punitive damages." Id. at
111-112. By contrast, Mother's Natural-Born Daughter Mattena does not contend
that Mother's Stepdaughters' failure to introduce evidence of Mattena's financial
condition was simply a "technical prerequisite".

Unlike Wal-Mart, Mattena

urged to the district court [R.2936-2950] that the jury's $308,555.46 punitive
damages award was excessive.

The Record also discloses [R.3699-3700] that

Mattena filed her Chapter 7 Bankruptcy petition on January 4, 2018, the day
before the district court entered its January 5, 2018 Judgment.

Under any

measure of excessiveness, the punitive damages award against Mattena was unlike the award against Wal-Mart in Hall - "excessive".
Along with Jury Instruction 44, Nelson, Bundy ~d Hall all indicate that it i~
Mother's Stepdaughters' burden - not Mother's Natural-Born Daughter
Mattena's - t_o present evidence of Mattena's financial condition, and that when a
plaintiff fails to carry its burden of introducing that evidence, the appellate court
should vacate the punitive damages verdict.
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The California Supreme Court has explained why a plaintiff rather than a
defendant should have the burden of introducing evidence of the defendant's
financial condition:
In light of our holding that evidence of a defendant's financial
condition is essential to support an award of punitive damages,
Evidence Code section 500· mandates that the plaintiff bear the
burden of proof on the issue. A plaintiff seeking punitive damages is
not seeking a mere declaration by the jury that he is entitled to
punitive damages in. the abstract. The plaintiff is seeking an award
of real money in a specific amount to be set by the jury. Because the
award, whatever its amount, cannot be sustained absent evidence of
the defendant's financial condition, such evidence is "essential to the
claim for relief. " ...
[B]edrock concerns - policy and fairness - support placing the
burden on a plaintiff to prove a defendant's financial condition. The
very nature of punitive damages points to this conclusion.
Whatever his or her injury, a plaintiff will be made whole by the
award of compensatory damages. An award of punitive damages,
though perhaps justified for societal reasons of deterrence, is a boon
for the plaintiff. Such damages constitute a windfall. The general
rule has long been that "He who takes _the bene#t must bear the
burden." It is not too much to ask of a plaintiff seeking such a
windfall to require that he or she introduce evidence that will allow
a jury and a reviewing court to determine whether the amount of the
award is appropriate, and in particular, whether it is excessive in
light of the central goal of deterrence. As explained above, evidence
of the defendant's financial condition is crucial to that
determination....
If the plaintiff does not introduce evidence of the defendant's
finances, the only alternative source of the information is the
defendant. It is inherently prejudicial to require a defendant to
introduce evidence of personal finances. Doing so places a
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(ij

defendant in the position of bidding against himself. A defendant in
that position is forced to tell the jury in effect that: "My conduct
doesn't warrant punitive damages. But, by the way, if you disagree,
please be gentle, I'm worth only the following amount." Such an
approach has the not unexpected effect of suggesting to the jury that
the defendant is admitting punitive damages should be assessed.
Put colloquially, the jury is led to think, "This person must know he
deserves a beating or else he would not be pleading poverty." ...
Requiring a defendant to prove his or her own financial condition
may improperly taint the jury's decision whether to impose punitive
damages in the first instance. The defendant's only alternative is to
remain silent as to personal finances and run the risk of being
annihilated financially ....
The prejudice in this case was exacerbated because it was tried
before Civil Code section 3295 was amended to provide for
bifurcation. Under the current procedure, the jury first decides
whether to impose liability for compensatory damages and whether
the defendant acted with fraud, oppression, or malice. (Civ.Code, §
3295, subd. (d); see also BAJI No. 14.72.1 (1989 re-rev.) (7th ed. 1991
pocket pt.) p. 64.) Only after finding such misconduct, is the jury
then asked to decide whether to impose punitive damages and, if so,
in what amount. As explained in the preceding paragraph, there is a
serious risk of prejudice to the defendant under this scheme if the
defendant is required to prove its own finances. The risk, of course,
was greater under former Civil Code section 3295 because it made
no provision for bifurcation. Under plaintiff's view, Dr. Murakami
would have had to introduce evidence of his finances even before
the jury decided whether he was liable for compensatory damages.
The Association for California Tort Reform, appearing as amicus
curiae on behalf of defendant, well states the point: "According to
plaintiff, if defendant had any substantial net worth, he also had but
a Hobson' s choice in a trial where liability and penalty were to be
decided in the same hearing: evidence of his financial condition
could be introduced with the likely result that it would inflame the
passion and prejudice of the jury to tip their judgment in favor of
liability." Putting the defendant in this untenable situation is
analytically similar to imposing on him the ·burden of contesting
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liability for compensatory damages while simultaneously proving
the amount of compensatory damages that should be awarded.
That, of course, is not the law. A plaintiff must prove the amount of
compensatory damages to which he is entitled.

Adams v. Murakami, 813 P.2d 1348, 1357-59 (~al. 1991) (en bane) (citations and
internal punctuation omitted). Of course, as Jury Instruction 44 correctly recited,
in Utah as in California a plaintiff must prove the damages to which it is entitled.

See, e.g., Gregory & Swapp, PLLC v. Kranendonk, 2018 UT 36, if 43, 870 Utah Adv.
Rep. 15 (11 To prove damages, a plaintiff must prove the fact of damages.")
(emphasis and internal punctuation omitted).
In performing a survey of national law on the assessment of punitive
damages, the New Jersey Supreme Court has cited Nelson and Adams as two
court decisions that "mandate[e] consideration of defendant1s financial
condition". Herman v. Sunshine Chemical Specialties, Inc., 627 A.2d 1081, 1087 (N.J.
1993).
In Vine v. GEICO Indemnity Company, 2017 WL 3498680 (D. Utah 2017)
(unpublished), former Utah Supreme Court Justice Jill N. Parrish acknowledged
and applied the same policies, albeit in a different context, that the Adams court
discussed at length:
An insurer cannot be forced to choose between 1) insisting on its
right to exclude evidence of settlement negotiations and coverage
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determinations (thereby losing the advantage of showing that it was
attempting to be reasonable in defense of the bad faith claims) and 2)
putting on such evidence and risking a prejudicial inference that it
has admitted liability on the contract action... . GEICO should not
be forced to defend one claim by possibly conceding fault on
another. Jury instructions telling the jury to separate the evidence
would not "unring the bell" that they had heard regarding
settlement, reserves, or other evidence that would be presented to
establish bad faith.
(citation and internal punctuation omitted).
Here, because Mother's Natural-Born Daughter Mattena had not presented
any evidence of her financial condition because (a) the district court had refused
her bifurcation demand and (b) Jury Instruction 44 did not require her to, the
district court neither "adduc[ed] any evidence" nor "ma[ de] any findings of fact"
"regarding [Mattena's] net worth or income" as Nelson requires. Instead, the
district court simply let the "jury just decide[] the issue" in a factual vacuum.
Separate and distinct from the district court's erroneous ruling on
Mother's Natural-Born Daughters' demand for bifurcation, in permitting the jury
to impose punitive damages without any instruction or evidence of Natural-Born
Daughter Mattena's financial condition, the district court committed reversible
error, and this Court should vacate the punitive damages award against Mattena.
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3.

The District Court Committed Reversible Error In Refusing to Strike the
Jury's Punitive Damages Awards As Presumptively Excessive.

Even if this Court concludes that the district court's refusal to order
bifurcation of the trial does not warrant the vacating of the jury's punitive
damages award against Mother's Natural-Born Daughter Mattena, that award is
hundreds of thousands of dollars higher than the maximum that Utah law
permits.
II

Crookston I established clearly set parameters beyond which [punitive
damages] awards may not go without some expressed justification." Crookston I
also mandated that those "parameters" "must be considered in assessing the
amount of punitives to be awarded". Id. at p. 808.
One of those

II

parameters" is "that the amount of a punitive damage

award generally must bear a reasonable and rational relationship to the actual
damages." Id. at page 810. This Court described that reasonable and rational
relationship: For punitive awards of less than $100,000 "a ratio of three to one
will generally be justifiable," but when all the punitive damage awards in a case
exceed $100,000, "a somewhat lower ratio is usually appropriate." Diversified

Holdings, 2002 UT 129, if 24; see also, Crookston I, 817 P.2d at 810 ("punitive
damage awards beyond a 3 to 1 ratio to actual damages have seldom been
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upheld and that where the award is in excess of $100,000, we have indicated
some inclination to overturn awards having ratios of less than 3 to 1.")
This Court issued a second opinion in the same case that reiterated its
disfavor of excessive punitive damages awards: "[P]unitive to compensatory
ratios of greater than 3 to 1 when the award is less than $100,000 would be
viewed skeptically when challenged as excessive and that even lower ratios
would be similarly viewed in awards exceeding $100,000 ... " Crookston v. Fire

Insurance Exchange, 860 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1993) (" Crookston II").
Crookston I explained the consequences of a trial court's failure to examine
a punitive damages award that exceeds these presumptive ratios: "If the award
exceeds the ratios set by our past pattern of decision, the trial court is not bound
to reduce it. However, if such an award is to be upheld, the trial judge must
make a detailed and reasoned articulation of the grounds for concluding that the
award is not excessive in light of the law and the facts." Crookston I. at p. 811.
In other words, "[t]he presumption, therefore, is that the award is
excessive. However, as we said earlier, this presumption may be overcome if the
trial court explains why the case is unique in terms of one of the traditional seven
factors or in terms of some other compelling factor." Crookston II, 860 P.2d at 939.
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And the Crookston I "excessiveness" guidelines "are primarily for the trial
judge, who is called upon to consider the propriety of a punitive damage award
on a post-verdict motion." Crookston II, 860 P.2d at 939. Stated differently, the
Crookston I guidelines are "to be used by trial courts in ruling on motions for a
new trial or motions for remittitur founded on the claim that a punitive damage
award is excessive." Crookston II, 860 P.2d at 939. The "excessiveness" inquiry
necessarily can only occur post-judgment, because until the jury assesses the
amount of punitive damages, a defendant has no way evaluating whether a
verdict is "excessive". See, e.g., Parrott v. Carr Chevrolet, Inc., 17 P.3d 473,486 n.14
(Oregon 2001) (" a party cannot challenge a verdict for punitive damages as
excessive until after the jury renders its verdict.

Therefore, that challenge

properly is made by a motion for new trial." (emphasis in original)).
The jury in this case entered judgment of $76,471.60 against Mother's
Natural-Born Daughter Mattena for compensatory damages growing out of the
Trust.

The jury awarded punitive damages of $308,555.46 against Mattena,

resulting in a ratio of 4:1, which is presumptively excessive under Crookston I and
later cases.
When an award is presumptively excessive "a failure by the trial court to
reduce the award or order a new trial is an abuse of discretion. " Crookston II, 860
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«.

P.2d at 939.

Crookston II thus shows that even under the most deferential

standard of review, Utah appellate courts vacate presumptively excessive
punitive damages awards. Under the circumstances of this case, however, the
standard of review is correctness.

In Crookston II, "the trial court issued a very detailed 23-page
memorandum of decision."

Here, the district court refused to disturb the

$308,555.46 punitive damages award against Mother's Natural-Born Daughter
Mattena: "The ratios in this case are slightly greater than 1:1. But the Court is
unaware of any case holding that ratios of slightly more than 1:1 are
presumptively excessive." [R.3042]
In calculating this 1:1 ratio, the district court committed legal error in three
respects.

First, it miscalculated the ratio.

Second, notwithstanding that

miscalculation, it deflated the ratio from 4:1 to 1:1 by including in the
denominator of the punitive damages calculation the $197,064.54 damages to
IYJ;qther' s Stepdaughte!s. arising f~om the ;tvJorga~ Stanley IRA. Third,
even if
.
.

damages to Mother's Stepdaughters arising from the Morgan Stanley IRA were
properly included in the denominator, the district court improperly deflated the
ratio of punitive to compensatory damages by imposing joint and several
liability on Mother's Natural-Born Daughters by entering judgment against each
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of them for the entire $197,064.54 and using that number in the denominator.
3.1

The District Court Erred In Calculating That the Ratio Of Punitive
to Compensatory Damages Was "Slightly Greater" Than 1:1.

The Special Verdict Form [R.2735-2739 (Add. A)] contains three
compensatory damage awards: (1) IRA damages totaling $197,064.54 against
both of Mother's Natural-Born Daughters (not against each), which neither
Mother's Stepdaughters nor the district court asked the jury to apportion; (2)
$76,471.76 in compensatory damages against Mother's Natural-Born Daughter
Mattena on Mother's Stepdaughters' Trust claims; and (3) $35,019.16 in
compensatory damages against Mother's Natural-Born Daughter Harris on
Mother's Stepdaughters' Trust claims.

These three compensatory damages
qj

awards total $308,555.46.
The Special Verdict Form [R.2735-2739 (Add. A)] awards punitive
damages of $308,555.46 against each of Mother's Natural-born Daughters for a
total of $617,110.92. No reasonable mind can conclude anything other than an
intent on the jury's part to have mathematically calculated a 2:1 ratio, that is,
$617,110.92 to $308,555.46, and there is no basis in the record for the district
court's statement that the ratio is "slightly greater than 1:1". In the legal vacuum
the district court created when it let the jury assess punitive damages with no
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18

instruction, the jury simply latched onto a 2:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages.
Where, as here, a punitive damages award is calculated "by simply
applying a fixed ratio to the total amount of compensatory damages", that award
by definition lacks "the required findings that each portion of the total
compensatory damage award resulted from conduct that met the culpability
standard of Utah Code section 78B-8-201(1)(a)." Wachocki, 2014 UT App 139,

,r

23 (vacating punitive damages award).
3.2

The District Court Erred in Including Any Part of the $197,064.54
Damages to Mother's Stepdaughters Arising From the Morgan
Stanley IRA In Its Calculation of the Ratio of Punitive to
Compensatory Damages.

A claim for punitive damages must be related to an underlying cause of
action on which the punitive damages may be based. See Richardson v. Arizona

Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d 636, 640 (Utah 1980).
3.2.1. Punitive Damages Cannot Be Awarded For Contract Breaches.
.

..

.

~

Utah law does not allow an award of punitive damages as a remedy for
contract breaches:
[A]s a policy matter, we do not wish to adopt a remedy for breach of
contract that punishes the breaching party. We have also held that
punitive damages for breach of contract, by themselves, are
inappropriate even if intentional and unjustified. Such damages are
only allowable if there is some independent tort indicating malice,
42 - J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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fraud or wanton disregard for the rights of others. Thus, we confirm
our earlier holdings that any measure of damages that punishes a
breaching party is inappropriate.

TruGreen Companies, L.L.C. v. Mower Brothers, Inc., 2008 UT 81,

,r

<il

19, 199

P.3d 929 (citations and internal punctuation omitted); see also, Smith v. Grand

Canyon Expeditions Co., 2003 UT 57,

,r

29, 84 P.3d 1154 ("punitive damages are

recoverable only for torts, not for breach of contract."); Jorgensen v. John Clay and
Co., 660 P.2d 229, 232 (Utah 1983) ("the general rule is that punitive damages
cannot be awarded for a breach of contract.")
3.2.2 The $197,064.54 Award to Mother's Stepdaughters for
Compensatory Damages Arising Under The Morgan Stanley IRA
Is Entirely for Breach Of Contract.

The district court and all parties recognized that all issues arising under
the IRA were in the nature of a declaratory judgment regarding (a) the meaning
of Mother's designation of her contingent beneficiaries to her IRA account as her
"children equally" [Tr. Exs. 8 and 240 (Add. B)] and (b) the effect of the IRA
Affidavit of Heirs limitation_ of parties eligible to receive a distribution to
"natural-born or legally adopted surviving children of Royalene Thomas". [Tr.
Ex. 240 (Add. B)]
On March 23, 2016 Mother's Stepdaughters filed their Motion For Leave to
File Second Amended Complaint and Memorandum In Support [R.789-814], in
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{ii)

which they "maintain[ed] they were legally adopted by Royalene Thomas and
wish[ed] to amend their Complaint to state they were Royalene's daughters."

e

~

Mother's Natural-born Daughters Opposed that motion:
Up until the time Plaintiffs became aware of an IRA, the beneficiary
of which was Royalene Thomas' s "daughters," Plaintiffs alleged that
they were Royalene' s step-daughters. Now that Plaintiffs have
become aware of this IRA, they suddenly recall that they were
adopted. . . . Plaintiffs have admitted that they have no court or
other documents showing that Royalene Thomas ever adopted
them. Therefore it would be futile to allow Plaintiffs to make this
claim through a second amendment to their complaint."
[R.864-867]. The district court denied Mother's Stepdaughters' motion because
Mother's Stepdaughters "have not presented any document reflecting their
adoption, from the court or otherwise." [R. 959]
On March 31, 2017 Mother's Natural-born Daughters filed a motion in
limine [R.2287-2290] requesting an order "barring any evidence to the effect that

(j)

Shellie Biesele and Melodie Jacobsen .... were adopted by Royalene Thomas".
On April 14, 2017 Mother's Stepdaughters objected on the grounds that:
"Plaintiffs do not have any order or document evidencing adoption. They have a
recollection of attending a court hearing where they recall it was about Royalene
Thomas ("Royalene") taking care of them. They may testify as to this recollection
to help establish their contention that Royalene considered them her children."

44- J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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[R.2430-2432] The district court denied the motion because it concluded that
Mother's intentions and the meaning of the Morgan Stanley IRA presented
triable issues of fact. [R.2444]
As a result, Mother's Stepdaughters' claim under the Morgan Stanley IRA
proceeded to trial so that the jury could conclude whether, since they were not
"natural-born children", Mother "considered" Mother's Stepdaughters to be her
"children" within the meaning of the Morgan Stanley beneficiary-designation
form [Tr. Exs. 8 and 240 (Add. B)].

If the jury found they were, Mother's

Stepdaughters would be entitled to a share of the IRA proceeds. If, on the other
hand, the jury concluded that Mother's Stepdaughters were not her "children"
under the Morgan Stanley IRA beneficiary-designation form, Mother's
Stepdaughters would be entitled to no IRA proceeds. In allowing the jury to
resolve the meaning of these phrases the district court necessarily first
determined as a matter of law that the terms were ambiguous and that Mother's
Stepdaughters' rights to any proceeds of the Morgan Stanley IRA depended on
the jury's interpretation of that ambiguous provision.
Mother's Stepdaughters proposed a jury instruction on that issue entitled
"Interpreting Documents":
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This case involves interpreting the meaning of a beneficiary form
filled out by Royalene Thomas. When it is unclear as to the meaning
of a term in a document, you may look to extrinsic evidence in order
to ascertain the intent of the drafter of the document. Therefore, if
the description in the Morgan Stanley IRA beneficiary designation
can apply to more than one person, you may look to other
documents executed by Royalene to determine what she intended in
the beneficiary form.

i)

e

[R.2507]
The district court gave a slightly different instruction on the subject (Jury
Instruction No. 12) (R.2698], entitled "Interpretation of IRA Contract", which
reads:
An individual retirement account (IRA) is a contract between the
person who establishes the IRA and the financial institution that acts
as the custodian. In this case, the person was Royalene Thomas, and
the financial institution was Morgan Stanley. The cardinal rule in
construcing any contract is to give effect to the intention of the
parties. If possible, those intentions must be determined from an
examination of the text of the agreement. If the contract language is
ambiguous or uncertain after careful consideration of the whole
integration, only then should you consult other documents to
determine the intent of Royalene Thomas and Morgan Stanley.
Similarly, the heading before the jury's answer to Special Verdict question
no. 1 [R.2736 (Add. A)] reads: "Interpreting the IRA Beneficiary Form" (emphasis
added to both). In the weeks just before trial Defendants and Plaintiffs all filed
pleadings focusing on the importance of evidence directed to the interpretation
of the IRA contract. Plaintiffs' status under the IRA was uncertain until the jury
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answered "Yes" to Verdict question no. 1. Until then there were only competing
claims. If the jury had answered "No", question no. 1 instructed the jury to skip
to Verdict- question no. 5 because Mother's Stepdaughters would have lost on
their contract-based claim.
As discussed in Point 4 of this brief, when Mother's Natural-Born
Daughters argued to the district court that because Utah has abolished joint and
several liability, it was legal error to enter judgment against Mother's NaturalBorn Daughter Mattena for the entire $197,064.54 compensatory damage award
to Mother's Stepdaughters arising under the Morgan Stanley IRA, and then to
enter judgment against Mother's Natural-Born Daughter Harris for the same
$197,064.54 award, Mother's Stepdaughters responded that Mother's NaturalBorn Daughters could be jointly and severally liable for the $197,064.54 award
because it was for a contract obligation:
Defendants cannot dispute that the issue of the IRA contract and
contract interpretation regarding the IRA was presented to the jury.
See Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Award
of·Attorney's Fees filed on June 12, 2017 at p. 8 (stating that the IRA
claim was a contract dispute) .... The case cited by Defendant in
their objection Graves v. Northeastern Services Inc. 345 P.3d 619, n. 10
(Utah 2015) makes clear that the Liability Reform Act, Utah Code
78B-5-817-823, applies only to torts and that joint and several
liability still exists under contract principles. See also Utah Code Ann
78B-5- 823 (stating that nothing in the Liability Reform Act affects or
impairs rights arising out of contract or agreement.)
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The jury interpreted the contract in Plaintiffs' favor and Plaintiffs
received $197,064.54 as a result of that contract. Defendants are
jointly and severally liable for those amounts under the IRA
contract."

[R.2854]

In opposing Mother's Natural-Born Daughters' argument on this issue,
Mother's Stepdaughters again admitted that their claims under the Morgan
Stanley IRA were contract-based: "The jury interpreted the contract in Plaintiffs'
~

favor and Plaintiffs received $197,064.54 as a result of that contract. Defendants
are jointly and severally liable for those amounts under the IRA contract."

[R.2854]
Albeit in a different context, the Idaho Supreme Court characterized a
dispute before it in a way that describes the true nature of the dispute here
regarding the Morgan Stanley IRA: "What is involved here is not an action in tort
to establish liability, but rather a declaratory judgment action involving
interpretation of written contracts ... " Unigard Insurance Group v. Royal Globe

Insurance Co., 594 P.2d 633,636 (Idaho 1979).
This Court established long ago that "punitive damages should be
awarded infrequently. Simple negligence will never suffice as a basis upon
which such damages may be awarded. Punitive damages are not awarded for
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mere inadvertence, mistake, errors of judgment and the like, which constitute
ordinary negligence. Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1186 (Utah
1983) (citation and internal punctuation omitted). Similarly, UTAH CODE section
78B-8-201(1)(a) mandates that "punitive damages may be awarded only if ... it
is established by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of the
tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent
conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward,
and a disregard of, the rights of others." Here, Mother's Natural-Born Daughters
lost their argument that Mother's Stepdaughters did not qualify as Mother's
"children" under the terms of the Morgan Stanley IRA documents. This sort of
contract dispute satisfies neither the common-law nor statutory criteria for a
punitive damages award.
The most that can be said for the jury's award of $197,064.54 to Mother's
Stepdaughters is that the jury determined that under ambiguous contract
language, they were "children" within the meaning of the Morgan Stanley IRA
documents and thereby entitled to a pro-rata distribution of its proceeds.
The fact that Mother's Natural-Born Daughters ultimately were
unsuccessful in their arguments under the Morgan Stanley IRA documents on a
contract-interpretation issue that the district court permitted to go to the jury
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does not allow a punitive-damages award based on that issue and those
damages.
The

trial court acknowledged these common-law

and statutory

requirements in Jury Instruction No. 44 [R.2729 (Add. C)], where it instructed the
jury that punitive damages could be awarded only "for fraud, breach of fiduciary
duty or conversion". TruGreen, 2008 UT 81; Smith, 2003 UT 57; Behrens, 675 P.2d
1179; and Jorgensen, 660 P.2d 229, represent just a sample of decisions of this
Court that establish that the finder of fact cannot impose punitive damages for
contract breaches or for unsuccessful arguments about the meaning of contracts.
Because Mother's Stepdaughters became entitled to damages only once the
jury answered Special Verdict question 1 concerning whether they were
"beneficiaries under the Morgan Stanley beneficiary designation form", Mother's
Natural-Born Children's liability arose from the jury's resolution of an
ambiguous contract provision (Mother's intent in using the phrase "children
equally" and the word "daughters" in the beneficiary designation form [Tr. Exs.
8 and 240 (Add. B)]. As a result, none of the $197,064.54 growing out of the
M~rgan S~anley IRA that the jury awarded to Mother's Stepdaughters is properly
included in the denominator of the punitive damages calculation.
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Correctly calculated, the ratio of punitive damages awarded against
Mother's Natural-Born Daughter Mattena to compensatory damages awarded to
her under the Trust is 4:1. As a result, the Court should vacate as presumptively
excessive the punitive damages award against Mattena.

4.

The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error In Making Some Awards
Joint And Several.

The arguments, supporting statutory and case law, and Record citations
for this issue on appeal are the same for Mother's Daughter Mattena as they are
for Mother's Daughter Harris. Accordingly, and pursuant to UTAH RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 24(c), Mattena adopts by reference herein this argument
IV of Mother's Daughter Harris' initial brief.
Conclusion

This Court should vacate the district court's award of punitive damages
against Mattena, because: (1) the district court failed to follow the legallyrequired bifurcation process causing the jury to award punitive damages against
Mattena in an amount that forced her to file Bankruptcy; and (2) the district court
allowed the jury to assess punitive damages without any evidence of Mattena's
financial condition by erroneously assigning to Mattena, rather than the Mother's
Stepdaughters, the burden of presenting evidence of her financial condition. In
the alternative, if this Court does not vacate the award of punitive damages for
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failure to bifurcate, it should vacate the punitive damages awarded against
Mattena, since the 4:1 ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages is
~

presumptively excessive.
This Court should also vacate the compensatory award growing out of the
Morgan Stanley IRA award and attorney's fees and costs award, because the
district court failed to grant Mattena' s request to allocate fault between the
Mother's Natural-Born Daughters. This meant that the district court improperly
imposed joint and several liability on Mattena for $197,064.54 in compensatory
damages and $150,332 in attorney's fees, despite the fact that Utah has abolished
joint and several liability. Mother's Stepdaughters failed to allocate fault for the
compensatory damages and attorney's fees and, despite this failure of evidence,
the district court refused to allocate the damages between the Mother's NaturalBorn Daughters.

The district court compounded its error by assessing the

$197,064.54 damages award, assessed by the jury against the Mother's NaturalBorn Daughters together, against each of them, individually.
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JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH, P.C.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT L ~ COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
I

SPECIAL VERDICT FORM

SHELLIE BIESELE and MELODIE
JACOBSEN
Plaintiffs,

Civil No. 140902798

v.

Judge: Matthew Bates

JODY MATIENA and MAY HARRIS,
Defendants.

TO:

THE LADIES AND GENTLE

N OF THE JURY:

Please answer all questions un, ess specifically instructed otherwise. If you
find that any or all of the Defendants are liable on any of the claims, you should
determine the damages to be awarded: to the party who has been harmed.
At least six jurors must agree on the answer to each question. It need not be
the same six that agree on each quesf n. When six or more of you have agreed on
the answer to each question, your :6 reperson should sign and date the form and
advise the Bailiff that you have finished.

I
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INTERPRETING THE IRA BEjCIARY DESIGNATION FORM
i

1.

Were Shellie Biesele and Melodie Jacobsen beneficiaries under the
Morgan Stanley IRA beJeficiary designation form?
!

i )(

Yes

No

---

If you answered "Yes" to question Jumber 1, please answer question numbers 2
question number 1, please skip to question
through 4. If you answered "No"
I
number 6.

tJ
I

2.

3.

4.

'

Did May Harris and/or 1Jody Mattena convert money from the IRA
belonging to Shellie Bie~ele and Melodie Jacobsen?
Jody Mattena

Yes : \/

No_ __

May Harris

Yes_µ(_

No

---

Did May Harris and/or Jody Mattena breach a fiduciary duty to
Shellie Biesele and Mel~die Jacobsen with respect to the money in the
Morgan Stanley IRA? !
Jody Mattena

Yes

May Harris

Yes

X
X

---

No

---

No

---

Did May Harris and/or iJody Mattena intentionally interfere with the
expected inheritance of Shellie B iesele and Melodie Jacobsen?
Jody Mattena

Yes

I \('

No_ __

!

May Harris

Yes

I'/...

<

No

---

If you answered "Yes " to question ~umbers 1, 2, 3, or 4, please answer question
number 5. If you answered "No" to ;all of those questions, please ski.p to question
number 6.
'

2
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5.

What amount of money ar~ Shellie Biesele and Melodie Jacobsen due
from the Morgan Stanley~?
$

/C/7✓063/. 5"'/

LACK OF TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY
6.

Should Amendment Nos.[3 or 2 or both of the Royalene Thomas
Revocable Living Trust b I void and unenforceable as a result of the
lack of testamentary capacjty of Royalene Thomas?
Amendment No. 3
Amendment No. 2

UNDUE INFLUENCE
7.

i

Tes

'v'

~

fes X

No- - No- - -

1·

Should Amendment Nos. 3 or 2 or both of the Royalene Thomas
Revocable Living Trust ; e void and unenforceable as a result of
undue influence on Royalte Thomas by Defendants?
Amendment No. 3

Yes
!

AmendmentNo.2

Yes

X
X

No- - No- - -

CONVERSION
I

8.

Did May Harris and/or :Jody Mattena convert money from the
Royalene Thomas Revodable Living Trust belonging to Shellie
Biesele and Melodie Jaco,en?
Jody Mattena

t

es

'/..

No_ __

i

No- - -

May Harris

3
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BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
9.

•

I

Did May Harris and/or Jo4y Mattena breach fiduciary duties to Shellie
Biesele and Melodie Japobsen respecting the Royalene Thomas
Revocable Living Trust causing damage to Shellie and Melodie?

I
JodyMattena

Yes

i
I

May Harris

Yes-X-

No_ __

No_ __

I

FRAUD
10.

1'

Did Jody Mattena corolt fraud respecting the Royalene Thomas
Revocable Living Trust I causing damage to Shellie Biesele and

Melodie Jacobsen?

j

Yes----ti.-

No_ __

INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE lwiTH EXPECTED INHERITANCE
I

11.

Did May Harris and/or Jbdy Mattena intentionally interfere with the
expected inheritance of ~hellie Biesele and Melodie Jacobsen in the
Royalene Thomas Revocable Living Trust?
I

I

Jody Mattena

Yes

l~

No_ __

Lb

No- - -

!

May Harris

Yes

Ifyou answered "Yes" to any one of buestion Nos.

6-11, please answer questions

12 through 15. If you answered "Nd" to all of those questions, please have the
foreperson sign the verdict form and notify the bailiff that you have reached a
I
verdict.

I

4
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DAMAGES
12.

13.

What amount of damages will fully compensate Shellie Biesele for
her losses?
!

·3_g_.J_3_5,_if_

Jody Mattena

$____
1

May Harris

l __________.__,,_ _ _
$_ _ _

In 509. 5g-

twm fully compensate Melodie Jacobsen for

What amount of damages
her losses?
I
JodyMattena

$

May Harris

$

--------,h_y0q,5g
---,------------

PUNITIVE DAMAGES

14.

15.

.SC J.35,cf
.

Have Shellie Biesele anh Melodie Jacobsen proven by clear and
convincing evidence that pefendants' conduct was willful, malicious
or reckless?
I

'X

JodyMattena

Yes

No_ __

May Harris

Yes___¼_

No_ __

If you answered Yes

tl

JodyMattena

$

{08'. 5"55", Lf./,

May Harris

$

Question 14, what amount of punitive
damages should Jody Ma~ena and/or May Harris be required to pay?

Dated this

5T!I day of May,

3of. 555, L/p

2r7.
I

5
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·--

-- -- ·- -----·-··--Account

Branch

Ao:ount

AE

llus

•

Fundi/lg

~~~@Q~~g~

i!III\\\\
1

~~~rj□~~QD!il□filg][Ql[ii]QliJD□l 111\lll\1 ' _
1

,

l 79-10229l I RA

ADDRESS

□~□QDQ~~Q~Qg~QD□~□D~uuLJLJLJLJLJLJ

itter

?

•

.cllt

~--~

CITY

lli~Q~Qw~Q~~~~~QD□□qQQQQQDD□□□

!Jfr7
r:l'47fi7£7Cl I(801) 467-0998
~12.J ~l.:!:J~t:J

l~~~t\£ Il 80~ 487-3665

L.- - - - - , - - : , - - " - - - - - - - - - '-

,,
SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

R~sidence
STATE COUNTRY

DAGENT ·'---

DWR EMPLOYEE

~@~ g][] [?]~ti]~ G]~ ~~~ I
SPOUSE'S NAME

Ix1 E1 N1T1

DYES KJ NO

DATE OF BIRTH

I 5]~ ~E][~J~

SPOUSE'S SOCLAL SECURITY NO.

1E1. 1n HI 01 11 AJ s · 1 1

,~~~~F.

---'-'---'---'---.0 AGENT

SPOUSE'S DATE OF BIRTH

Ib1 21 J sI d11 a 71 d b~boknl

BRANCH OFFICE
(Part 2)

TYPE OF IRA ACCOUNT

UNINVESTED CASH

FEES

~ernal Standard lRA {111) 0 Spousal IRA [1121
overlRA [12l)

l elect to have the Custodian deposit all
uninvested cash in my account in;

□

D Dean Witter/Sears Liquid Asset Fund Inc.
(Whose prospectus I have received)
D Savings Account

Annual
maintenance· -$30
-$20'
Spousal
Tennination
-$50
(except as a result of retirement,
death or disability)

NOTE: Uno election is made, uninvested
cash will be deposited in Dean Witter/Sears
Liquid Asset Fund Inc.

"The spousal fee is waived for the
first year.

Combined Account

Rollover/

Please consult tax ad visor as to tax ramifications of
com miogling rol\!J,ver assets. ( RO/STD (141]
RO/SPS [142] R!_}/SEP [161))
D Simplified Employee Pension IRA (1.31]
D Simplified Emi~~ee Pension/Stand,ud IRA [151]
..

•
•

DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARY (Attach additional sheets ifnecessary°J
I hereby designate the following peffiOn(s} as primary and contingent beneficiaries:
RELATIONSHIP CONTINGENT BENE!!ICIARY

J PRJMARY BENEFl~~RY

HUSBAND

T<ENT E. THOMAS
.,

•

2178 BENDAMERE CR.

2178 BENDAMERE CR.
:::;ALT LAK.t; c1·.n,

DAUGHTERS

CHILDREN EQUALLY
ADDRESS

ADDRESS

CITY .

RELATIONSHJP

STATE

1JT. 1j41U'.:I

ZIP

CITY

STATE

SALT LAKE CITY. UT.

84109

ZIP

I understand that at death the interest in the Account described above under the Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. Jndividual Retirement Plan (the "IRA") shall
become the property of the primary beneficiary, if he or she survives, and if no primary beneficiary survives, then of the contingent beneficiary, and if
no designated beneficiary survives, or the Custodian cannot locate the beneficiary, then the Custodian shall distribute the amounts payable to my spouse,
if he or she survives me, and, if not. to my children in equal shares, and if no children survive me, to my ~tate.
[ reserve the right to revoke or change this beneficiary designation. All prior designations (ifany) of primary contingent beneficiaries are hereby revoked.

or

I hereby instruct DWR to D withhold D disclose my name, address and security positions to any issuer whose stock DWR is holding for the
account numbered above.

l

r •
i

I hereby adopt the Dean Wilter Reynolds fnc. Individual Reti rernent Plan ("the Plan") which is made a part of this Agreement, establish the
account described above and name Dean Wiu.er Reynolds Inc. ("DWR") as Custodian of the Accounl. This Agreement will be effective on acceptance by OWR as Custodian.
I have received the booklet containing the Plan, Disclosure Statement and fee schedule before signing this Adoption Ap;rr.ement. I have read the
Plan and understand that DWR has no discretionary investment responsibility with respect to the assets held in my Account under the Plan and
that DWR will invest and reinvest the assets in the Account only on my direction. See Sections :i I and 6.2 of the Plan.
I understand that adoption of the Plan has significant Federal and State tax consequences and r have been advised by DW R to consult my attorney,
accountant or other tax ad visor.
.
.
For Rollover and Rollover Combined Accounts Only: I irrevocably designate contributions made to the aboveaccounl as Rollover contributions
under the applicable mvisions of the Internal Revenue Code.

..

•

••
l
I

Accepted by OWR :i.s Custodian

1-

,
I
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~

J

Before completing this side,
be sure lo separJte this paj!e
£rom lhe white copy.

ACCOUNT NO. _ _ __
COUNTRY CITJZENSHfP

CODE

MARITAi. STATUS

liMPLOYEE OF M&:MBHR OF EXCHANGE

D Married

□ Yes

□ Single

NO. OF DEPENDENTS

r-or Dean Willer use only.
Nu new account form CU9362-3J is nc-eded,

D Widowed

-··

0 2. Aggressive

03. Capital

Incmne

CODE

OCCUPATlON

BUSINESS

CODE

□ New

D NEW New Contribution

E,cisting

□ RI R RoJlover

TRADE AUTHORIZATION

0 Investment
Advisor D Other
Limited
Limited

I

I I

I I I

□ 4-. Callin

0 3. Walk in

□

□ ~!~~a~t:~

AE REGISTERED IN STATE OF RESIDENCE OF:

AE SIGNATURE

D 6. Cold Call

□

1. Sears Center

I

f

II

I l I l

f

I

f

DATE

Agent?

Bank DA DD

Business

□A

OD

□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□
□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□
□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□
□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□[]□□□□□□□□□
-

EXTENDED DATA D Third Confirm □ Third Statement

Ali MEMO l

I

LIQUID ASSETS (M~)

□ Yes □ No

EXTENDED DATA □ Second Confirm D Second Statement

Name,
Addre.cu.,
& ZipCnde

I I I I I

SPOUSE'S ACCOUNT NUMBER

0 $20 Set Up & $20 First Year O Special SEP Group Fee

Name,
Address.
& Zip Code

I I

NET WORTH (Ms)

5. Referral

PAYMENT OF INITIAL FEES

Client?

I I

I I I I

□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□

HOW ACCOUNT ACQUIRED

0 2. Advettising

Transfer from

l

INCOME (M's)

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT

. --·

YEAR OF FJRST MARKET EXPERIENCE
Stocks
Options

I IIF APPLICABLE
I I I I I
I I AGENTI NAME.

OYes

□ Yes ONt>

□ TRA

Deposit

ACCOUNT NO.

arHER DWR ACCOUNT

(j)

04. Spe~ulaLiun

ACCOUNT INITIAL TRANSACTlON t$250 initial and subsequent minimum contribution.)

□ 1. Lecture

-

Apprecialinn

DWRCLll::NT
□

--

OBJr:CTJVE

DJ. Income

ib

,

Firm Name

Bank DA DD

Business □ A O I)

□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□
□□□□.□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□[]□□□□□□□□□
□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□[Jl JD□□□□□□□□
□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□LJLJ□□□□□□□□□

lJ[]□□□[J□□□□□□□□□□□LJ[-l[_JD□□□□□□□□□□□□□OlJ
["l[lfJ[JlJ□□□□[J□fJ[J[J□□□l-1[ .ll J□□□□□□[J[J□□□□[Jf-J[Jll
r ."lrl[][ }[lflL]fl[JLJ[][JnLJC1nrJl Jl ·1r ]□□□□□[]□[ ][J□□[J□[][J[J

Ag MEM02

1-11.

11

lf JL H

J[l.JlL ·11 lr Jf Jl l[JLlrl[ H II lQtl[J[J[lfJ□[]l][f
lL J[_][_l[.Jl
·----J
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Morgan Stanley

To:

16197802451

Subject:

Attn:·May Harris

From:

Jennifer Sturgis
+1 801 947-3022

Date:

Wed June 24 2015

Ref#:

RROWJXQD7Z5WN41Y-001

Pages:.

11 (Including this one)

•
•

l'\

•
Tius message is intended only for the use of the person or entity to which it is addressed. If received in error, use
of the information is strictly prohibited; please destroy the info[lilation and notify the sender. The attached is based
on infonnation generally available to the public from sources believed to be reliable. No representation is made
that it is accurate or complete. Certain assumptions may have been made in this analysis which have resulted in
any returns detailed herein. No representation is made that any returns indicated will be achieved. Changes to the
asswnptions may have a material :impact on any returns detailed. Past perfonnance is not necessarily indicative of
future returns. Price and availability are subj<,ct t.o change without notice. The attached has been prepared solely
for information pmposes, and is not an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any security or
instrument or to participate in any trading strategy.
·
Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC, Morgan Stanley & Co. International Limited, Morgan Stanley MUFG Securities Co.,
Ltd. and/or their affiliates may have positions in and may effect transactions in securities and instruments of issuers
mentioned herein and may also provide or seek to provide significant advice or investment services, inclµding
investment banking, for the issuers of such securities and instruments.
ADDITIONAL mFORMATION_IS AVAfLABLE UPON REQUEST.

•

EXlI.rarr~
K. MCLAUGHLIN, CSR.
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Morgan Stanley I Documents .
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SOCIAL stCUB\!!fiO.

•

•
•

n~~:,.I
i>.1111~11=

l

r•~c

flO\ 487-J665G~cin

l:ddcllfr
•
STATE COUlfllW VWR EMl'IJJYEt

IIATE OF DIRTU

'

-~@~ liJLI ~li]li][] Ii]~ [y][§E] l Q)'PS DNO I [ill @6]'4{1
SPO\l£SIIA.'ll!
•
, ,S!'OOSt'S~ALstr:u~ Sl'OUSll'SIMT21J~1iffrd
~ ..
..
. J . ·a . cJ .
w..tt1..n.1
l..La 51 Jr"
1~1E1mn I; ID lifg 11 N s I ·1 1

TYPE OP IRA ACCOUNT

.. UNINVBSTED CASH

0 U ~ I S!Arul;itd IRA 11111 0 Spop'-'ll IRA (I Ill

!Parr 2)

·I

FEES

I clca to '1i~\"ttbt CU1tooi1n dcFI i11

'31fonorer JR.A 11211

UlWiCU OFFICE

Anrniul

unlnt"Uti:d <all\ [ti IIIY .11cccunl ,~
rru<lnl<.'IJtnCO
- $30
D.fwl1im,I.
Comblnt:.d A~~11nl O 0¢a11 WlUtdSC:al'f l,f1111[d ,\mt Fuodlac. Bpo~•I
- sw•
' Pfe:1ueonsu111u 1dY!toT lllD UX bmltl=tlon10r
(Whoscp1DSpcttta I hare rl(rfndt
ll:nn[nlrtlnll
----$GO
coinmln11rintrol~asms.(RO/STD(Hll
OSni.....iAccount ·
{c,xcept~anis!,11ul'rc1lnm\tn1,
RO/SP$ 1u21 110,sSP 1161n
....
•
. d=t1' « 111~bQhn
Si I"' d
..
( l
NOT&l(11,o~lutla11b~da,11ron'luttl1
1Thnpo1111I ~ 1$ w,fw.-d tnr ~ •
0 1111P ..,c Emlllo)'~ l'oMlan SRA Ill
gcb will bD deposited in Oun Wil~t/SQn0 Slmplin~ i!al.D{orcc l1c:11llvll/Slmrbrd IRA (151)
IJquid Asnl Furwl Inc.
f'ast }-Pr.

•

I

..

.

,'

' DESIGNATION OP BENEPICJARY thlladl:iddt1lon:il.chtt!1Un1:0!10o1

_:.r-

I hctdiy c!cs11n1it th, Collowlhi ~~ 11rlm:ary 1n1d '1lnlin1tnl bcMfrdarln:
PRIMARY PeNEjli£{UY
IRELATI0Nsmr COIITINCiENT Bf.flEF'ICTAR\'

tEHT

•

t. TUbms

AOORts!!

·1· nusl3AND

~•

ADDRtSS

.·.2-178 BEffi>AMERE CR..
CIT'' '
.=.;..,,

2178 DENDAfffll CR,

STATE

SALi LAK& Cllr I

I REI.ATlOHSIIII'

I DAJJGHTims

cRlLDRF.N EOUAtLY

v,-.

Z.J.P

ST/ITR

CITY

'Zll'

SALT 1.AKE CI1'Y. UT. 84109

O'fLV'I

I1111dusLancllha1at dca11> lh~inler?Slia !he ACC011n1 d~cn~abfflunderche llc:in W"rt1crRtr11old$fl(. l11dMt!11vl Rctiltntt11I l'l111l1hr "IRttlsb~tl
bcoomr Uii:.p~y or the primary bt11tfir.ury. Vhi: IJI' sl11! survftt:\. and II n~ p.rlrm111 beni::6dur illr\'IYl!J, !l!tnoftllr conl!11ge11c tieht6cl.irt. i11d fl

n0dc1i,11111td ~mf1wl}' ;11Nires,onhe Cvstadlm C1111not loalc rhr buu:liduy11hen Ill# Cvs[c.mn sl111l di>tmult (be ~'16ullb pay.tbl~lo1n1tJHIU~,

llh~or~~~1nit:.ncid,1(nof,lo111yc:hild~1tn,qm1h!r•,cs.•ndirnrl'dlUortn1urviV11mt,r11m1e11,1~

•

,

.

.

I krc-by oeo;,11lic Dran Willer Re.}11olds Inc. hwlviJp:11 IRclfrcmcal Plio lih~ Plin1 wlilthii ni.,dc a pall 11£t~k/igr<CltlfflLcsttblwi lh\a«ottll1 dcl:Olbtd wvc llld ~inr Dea11 W11tcr Reynr'<lds 111c (·o\\·W') atCu~ndfa.n cl th~ ACQ!llnl, Thi~ l\11~n1cnr •ill~ rfftCIIYt on ae«pr•
ana: by DWll ts Ca,todian,
·
· .
•
•
I h.ivc rccdnd 1be be19kl~1 ~lni111 lhe Pl:tn, Dittlnsa,, SI llcmcniand ltt 1cheoule bdcn Jil(l}lr.g thit Aw,li,111 Aj!rte~nL I M-Yt ttild lhl'
Pl;,n 'IIQd vndci<;terd llllt DWRhas 11odl~dQ1111ry invtrlmrnJ n:1pvn'1hm1r wilh rcrpeclCo l~.t,i.rt, held fn 111r ,'(CllUlll ullllrr 1110 Plall ~lld
llull l)lfll wll!ldl'((Undrdnt"tlC ll1c l!lfeff liilbt ACl:#1/llllllrlJ nn lllf dirtct1:in,SreStl;ll1art:I I iUII.I nnflhll'lan.
•
·• ·I 611<ft~dlhll adoflllon~llbrPlanbanlinlli~nl ftdcrahrvl!>lz1e 1ai1t0nscqllc111Xs~I havt bcena.dvfst\l b) D\VRca((llmllt m1dlu11111')'.
accounun\ ..- 01he11aod'vm1r.

·

•

•

•

rv, Ra llimr .rrnd.Rollw~r Combine ll ~un.1; OIi If! IinM-:.ihlt &KMJ:Oll.le ca~lribu1inftS Ill.Ide (111l1c 11bnvc.im-i111 ~, Rlilfiwrr¢1111rib111i1111,
11nd~c thu ,Hali 1 ,vii/qqs 011!1cln1rnml Ren:Auo C(,d\',
,
•
SIGNATll
FIM .:...J~l-'T ;· ~~~- :J.•l!\l'F.

•

I .·. I

J.l{COMMI/NITY i9.R.Clf>F.Kl1ST./l'l'ES ,~i. ,•~·'"· ,.,. ,.,, :m ~. ~"' SICiNA'fUR~ OF l~H:flPPANr_!i Sl'!lllSF.
I here
A~111rcl bt OWR ~• Custuclr.in
11/L'lr:lff,\

®

•

lnsernllxiighi1o~co1dl1n1clhisbc:11tfldAryde,is11~19i\ All11rio, dtsl11Dlllonillfitiy>olprimarynre111nfnrt111b011e(id~lui,chmbrtc\,iktd,
I hcrd>y lni!tl"I DWR lo O wilhhDld a dJ~lose. 'In)' namr, ~'rld1m and JCt11niy posillais to ~nr rs.r.ucr who~ tradt OWR i, hddt11r {o, lbt
icco\11}\ nvmtic,cd ,bcv-6.
•
•
..

I

, u 1.t,,..u1r11,1111111\i..'\:1111►►,r•
I
- - .. ..
. ,_,i, ...

(
)·

____.,..,,.

•
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· \·_: (·.~_·. ·.. Affidavit.of Heirs
·-L·•:,· . .

.

:,•.!.

'tt.:l-~..

Morgan ~tanl$y

. .,

··:·.

,• ••

Scaie of
)ss

~~o/d

•

.

~\q..._y_ -~: .J}~I( .~L .. ·- .. _·--·· .. ,bclng duJr Jworn dcp0$c :111d .tll)' thP-f I Ml the 111nural-bom
71,( O\t\,\ a~ (dc,cd~nt), tht: owner of Morg;,n SWllcyacan.1m number
.Ro_'{ f-":-:.Le~, -e.. tv1 ._,

1, or lcg:ilfr :idoP,D!d dilld of -

~

-· -•-\d¼.::.\

~~ ,:tt.Q,_. - - 1 ;ind that ro ~he: bcsr of my knowledge 11Jld bc!lier, the: ro,llowfng tndlvlduols 11tc tr;c
only other nncur.U-born or legally ndop1cd sun•Mng childn:n or ~r:c:1:dcnt.

NJ oJy T. M. +i-t
(I,._

-'N:/A

ltt.Mt .,.,

•--•

••••

• •----•••-·

RCUITIOHSHIP TO ~tDEl-lflAlfD lO OlHER REI.EVMII fA!tlllY MENDEii$)

-. .. - - • - - • - - • -

flEIAllOHSHIP TO DEC£Dttil (ANO TO OTHER REUVAl(t rAJA/1.Y MEMntRSl'

,

l

.;,.u,. N/A- .

N·/A

.
.
.bct~'\k.t-e \" _.. _. .__ ·-- __ .,_ ... _. __

"'--°l ____ ···-- ___ ... ·-- .•

.

::· ?.iZ

••

niUITIONSHIP 10 ofucooowTo'1001iiiit ~ElEVANT FAIAiLY MEMS~ •

..!

.
P.MIOtl.SHIP fo' DEctOErit

,;fz~(1..
.../lrtf#ocw..U~

<ANDTOOllfDI RELCVANlfNdlll' M£148Ertsl

...

S\vom to \or :tffirmcd) hcfore me rhis

(Give official c:;ip:tdt}' of 08.ichtl :1.dmini$tcrlng onrh)

Mt Commission cxplrcr, .".J\,,\~.

141 hQ\P. __ ........"
HASIHA BARUT

Commission ti 'f94 ◄ 0IS
Nol~ft Pbl)(i~ - C'111irofnlh
hn Oit~O Co\in\y
•1;:

•

~
~

Mz:.oomm.yg1resiu114:201;:l

·---·..
AFFIDAVIT OF HEIRS
RETAFf'H Cl0/20ltJ

_::._..:.:::=======================================================-.::":.::·-::::::=::::
PllGf.~Of2

11:1 2012. Mor~an Stanley Smith Bnmoy LLC, Mernbor Slf"C,

I"' CS i'204U82 OWl!

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Morgan Stanley

For lntorn~I Usq 9n1y
Gr•nch No,

1 2 4

FNPWA d

Account No.

1 '7

1 2 6 6 7 6

.•

7

(ii

Affidavit of Heirs

Jss
C~umy of~\1

LA~("Ll'od.\..\ . ~ \V\'7\.,\ \-e..n~.

I, .
•
, being duly swom depose nrid s;ay ch.:a.t I am rbe n:truriil-bom
llr .legal!)' Dd<tcd child of ROYALE:NE THOMAS
(dcccdenr), the owner of Morcan Smitley ru:coum nu1nbcr
124-1 2667 .:. 177
and 1hat 10 chc best or my knowledge and belief, the following lndMdunls are rhe
1
only ocher narnral-born or legally adopccd ~urvivlng children of dcccdem.

N(UWa,,I . ~r)'..

~itti\\.\k~.

RELATIONSHIP T() DECEDENT (ANO to OTHER Plll.E'<e)il FAMIU' MEMBERS)

nnAnowsH1P i-o oECl!Dt'NT cAiio ,a· OTHER RELEVANT F/IUILY MEMBEPS>

I
.I
RELATIONSHIP TO DECf.DtNT CAHO TO OTHER RELEVANT FfJAfLY MCMB£RSI

4'
NAME

.

, ·RF.lATIOHSHfp TO OECEDENT (AND TO OTHER REl.tVANT ftUJILY M(MBERS)
.

,

.~~

Sworn co (or affirmed) before me chb

~
DAY

\Le

.... ·.... ,

( jvc o cial np:icky of official administering mi.di}

\t[t~.).o fl-( ·

My Commission cxpir~:

·c

◄

•

•
•~

•

• · •

Nomrllll Sea'!

•

,

_

• Notary PubUe

--- -- ... ,· MtlMJm•.ErpJmLQGCJS•.2D.1A

,

.
.... ,..

....

· ... . . :·.-:·.._' . ·..··:

1...

ERl.C Q~QOff. ,
.
:•
sutu,f.UtAh
. . 1
Ootnm. Hn. 683799
•;
.

,

.

•· • •
• ••

·1

.. ~ ~·
....

I•••:

••

..

....

......

,•

....
•

I

.. •

, · ,
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~•r4·, \

d~ ru~, \ d \.oloi-LPrMVPJ

IRA Distribution Form.
Section 1-IRA Type: 0

Tridilio11allRh

¥

•

O Rolh IRA D S£rJSAR-sai IF.Ji O SIMPLE IRA D rnharilod IRA

Section 2-Payee Information: 0 IR4Chvner 0
• f,iayLynnHarrfs.
t!U!C
•

:
•
.~t1~(M:1yapan Drlvo

..

.aODllfS$
c;QT

•
LliMO&II

•• ·- ••

Morgan Stanley

BMeliclal)'

•

•

,

•

Section ~-Rpason for Distribution Request (select one)
Unrter Age 59½ (penalty may apply)

0

Prem;1111t Oi$ttlbulion

0

over Age 59}1

Q

72al S11bst,nt1~n, [q1ul Pfflodlc: Payiiostlt

H011111I DJSlnbu!!on

(.efroCO!Ap!clo$ecil)tJ 6)

•

Vlher-Al!d1Uo11a1 Oooumontallon May bs Required

•

.

•

(7.j Deatlt of Acco11nt Drm~ (C&rtrltid OeJlb ~dica!eand flotatlzed /lffidavn of Oomrcw and Dcblmquued fa inlllal dlsln'bu1lon Gllfy. h.'of ~qu~td fc, ldh«ilcd IRAJ
J111s( 1114 [$!ale Benef~larics n1rnt pUNido odddl0111I documijntali,,i.

0

DIIOCI l!onowr lo aOuallOcd Re(immmt Plan (Allach qusfilled plun lette111f a~pt~n~
<fOI ~,1ecn11 Rollnm onl)', 11$0 p,ovido rten Hamc ind Address beknY. Use this fQllll I« cft~k$ onM

E1rnlnes $ ••

[] llolund DI E.teeS$ Ccl/ll11011h~l J~ ll!1r
• - • Ptlfldpal f. _
0 Df\Ot'U(Anacb final DivorceOeaei im6 suppcrlln~ propeiir setlleroenU

0

Dlubllilt

Section 4-Payment Amount and Frequency {check all that apply)
Payment Amou_nt.
Frequunoy

O ~s~IOC/n~ t .
_.
0 One•limePatlltl P~enl
f11•K1111f(lhclhcgndprwidcdbelo.r,all111:b•ddilim11l~co1~ifnctdcd)
0 R~rlnt:
Stirt0a1o:. ••
•• - • ,
llllinco.ncrecelvcdinloAccoir,11
•
0 ldortlhl7 0 Ouatt~ly O ~rala11Du111)' ·O hrunull1
Gi.'.i r\ttoui11 lt1minati11n •
II 1hls rEtUrrine pavmenl is rDf AUi O-RL!O,,hocll lbl$ liOt 0
·
~nd abo ~l!lpf~le Seclloo 8.
VarltAI Dl~lrl1111Uon AulborJutloA tYl>Ah
\~1,iable a1aou111,ad dlstrlbu!ID11 ~eli'1t-'1l'l'!~ll1od lo!le dttemi!ocd brllie 11,i:ounl lt61de, !omcll paJQ1cnl. lau1hoillcM01can SlanlcySmm, DamerlLC ("Morgan Ste111ey'1
10 ,ccept vttblll rcq1111Sls ftt1bescanwu11ls Iba\ Iiaayurikt! f10111 tln1, 10 rimg, Iunderstand 1~1l verhl dlstrlbulroouoq11ile awi!hhol:linc 11lcctionllral m'll be osed ro1 all
(11lure\ic1bildll11lb11!1oni Anyching~ fD lflll1b;ldlne ~uire tvtll!M aulltarllalioo by compJ!ling a 1mv dlslrltdiQn fCJm. lntemal frmlm toa11othes Mxgan stan!lly 11011•
1t111emm1 a«OUnt ,cqu1to1ha1 Ul~IRltCA\nel"$ na1nandla1 fde11urrc.11oci numbcrmrs1clt111&relrlf actU111tl. W.bil1fisblti11t1,11sc:anbllp10Ce$Sed l)lncnb, \'i, mcdlorrd1e
~. 21 l&Cll wt.fl! casb lo lh.e H(A11m\Y'J rJternal banhc;ov111 os 3) mhor ln·UnO via an imernal jcvmal fD 1l1e ~AOlm?r's f&orpn Stan!e)' no11-rellrC111trrl zco,uol.
[J E'n!i,e AlllOllnl r.uh

0
0

0

List Spoclfio Amti In-Kind:
IJllllnlll)' (SbJref/11nl1$)

!lallD ol $~urity cr1l11tf102 Symbol

....

... . .. -.- ... ·-·

Se cti On 5-Ma thod of Dfstrlbutlon (check aII that apply)

D Cl1eck IJSlled lo IRA owner at an al!crn111c addrcn:

[) t111101nJlc6Cfr~ISenl loltgaladdiosson recml) •
•
~ tnlemal lwmal (Req1,l1ct lhal lhe!Rho-,,,w bo ~n aull101ized sirnl!f on !lie rccnivlne rmil
ollct'OUPltltlrilbet)
l ,, \
'f l
~ Cledillo h!DJcen S!anfey .iCCITJlll nvm!n.,1 •to-'\ d::-). ~
0 Cleek! to M«ein Slaaley ecc011nl ru~bec~

oo- D[] Loeair e·;~

tfi

<,?

Ctcill IQ ldatgan Slanlcy o=imf !Ullllb~,

-

•-

_.,_.

~rf .. -·-

Ch~ic~~e, ;cii.up
red und Wl1tT1,nsfe< tAll&c!r W110 r1a11sfe1 Mqucst r-orm>

- • •..

l::J Oaec( 0 - via ACH lo Illy bani, artlei.llt!llllOl sccourir nam£4 bcf~Y. nrot AVDUtible lor dccea~d 01 llll111111N IRl\s)
•. forctoc<\lne Jr.counls aua~~{I voidpO cmc~ OOHOI SEND OIPDSIJllCI\ElS

t\1rou111 l1pe (check~>

0

Ch~kini

111,\liOl'IWk
0

11~•11.aJ tr.S11~iviowu,1A•wii at

@)

{

)

D Savina$

- . ...

,PJ6:ii

.

t(lfffl~llflt.i°~----

·llfWlf ~WHI~I m111~1~m~.

Ill. D1SIRiliUIID» I 01/M
R!llJIAClllllDU Ul/701ti

PX6HOI

. •, .

: .. ·
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IRl~I._

rM'IIU

Section 6-12(1} Substantfally Equal Perlodlo Payments-Dl$trlbut1on.ca1culatfon
Pl.£.ASE AllOWATlWJ 15 B!ISIH~SS DAY$ FOR roup, flRST72{1) D1$71U8UTlQII TO et PRQCE$$EO, YOU ARE RESPOHSl8t.E FOil lllE ltlltRESl l!'-ll
AIIDtflE'OISTRl8UTIOII MElHOO CHOSEH,
.
NOTE: nm disln~u!WIIS, Ollte begun, lllUSI conlinur unchangod ~11111 acn 5~K DI ,~, IIYe 7eirs, l'thicbc~11r Is lol11t ll111so pa7menls will eoqunue \lltlU
·
•
•
Plcm select ywr dislribulitin method beloit
11} 0 Ule flllt~lanq,/11141111\!d inlnimutn ditlribullon 111elhod
me cfislrilmtl1111an1C11nl rtlll bcca&:ulated am111all)' a11a·w111 b~b.no!I 01111wp1loryt!at-e1111 varue, cnv1dell by lh~ lll11~ec1a11trniethod chosen:
\'>1! receivurnlten 11olll~aU1111 lo tillcellhem.

0 Sine1~ure

D Jofnl ur~

·

II )'OUI Mnl hie crpoctancy If ftle~lid, we ,,m uso 1110 •011~liciary iolom1a1io11 cunenflran 1,la,vllb 11$. To na111c orcl1ang~ b1mrllel,,y l11loin1;(101"1,
~ltu:9 ~IQJl{t.lni'I IR~-Onignilklil orllt111lh:i:art hii111.
•
,. ,
• • '
C11J O t.ma11u.a!1011 Melh06
1n1e1cst rute
•~
O A:lnuJI tampoonoint
O .01ncr Coml]Ollfll!i11e
lilQ O ArutuiizatlonMelhod •
rntemlR,te
%
D /141111alCoin11cc111di11&
D Otl1e1Co!llpoundh10

fo1 cm and llll} ablWB, the IRS requires 111111 ~ ·rmonablB• Interest rate ~E U#d. 'ltoa5oniwe· ts defined' os !lelr,O!t\ 80~ and 120~ ol lhe lerferal mid•l'C1m rate. at
annoonce<l.r.ionl~I)' by Uto IRS 11ndar Colfo scelioa 1274(dl, for rithtrol lhc two (21 nuinlbs p1ttcd'mg th= nwnlh in llhlch Ille distribullo11 becins.

D B2sed on stltling 7210 schedulo slar(od ca ....-~.

• ....... tran$f61ted in ftom

_

Section 7-Death Benorrt Eler;tfQ11
Rollover In ,riwsc's \M D Lump 1u11 12J lr.i11sler ID lnhailcd IRA lo pay 0111!1 benl'!ldar(s

0

siniJ6 hit: a11ttlancy 111 applicablt file tljlCCl1ncy

I

_

• D!l(~(OIJl(ll '"1:IISrOCIIJ/$lll/Jl

0

07110/1071

01/031201'3

Transf1ulolnll2riled IRA fopayoof
'l\ilhili 5 )"e:11 or IRA owucfs 11~111

11111(~01.U Ol llllllll - ·-- ••• -•

t,HI.P.llUll',1/f'SIM!rtrDC~III... _ . - - -•

'

:~ •• _ ·---~-

" '

Section 8-Requlred Mlnfmum DistributJoos ("RMD") (check One) Select your payment frequency In Section 4.
0 AUlO-llND (auiomallcally pays ool the axacl amOOlllJ
.
I[ fOll elcd. /\WO-flWl, lhe CJfR a1nounl of )Wf .a1111v11I r.ldD mu be paid 1111111plomiUeall)'. II you~e !hltoj)UM, !'ft wrn prurata )'OUr lelllainlng llMD 8dl(Ulll Cll'C/ lht
r~maining pq~tl\1 Df lMs ct!endar )Ur, for~~, ym lbcm11llei, wi:will '1!1tvlaloyour RMI> and disnlb111e fl om i!Je cnlno )WI ~mil Oil lb¢ l1oq11ellq' .\clt<IL'lf it ~t!Qn 4.
lhls ci«\il>illl!D 1emain In l!llccl Unlll WI! retelve u¢atCJ} lllsl!l1'1JvnS lr(llll ]OU [o 1/o olltCMlte. ror Colculallon p11rpr,ses. 11 AUTo-RM0 lschECJ;ed lhellefullll eatirlallon
will use ttio \1111!0tm tab!!. .RM0 1111 !be )1!31.ollhaBlAO'lill~ dealh rn~t be paid out by l)c(etnlxt 31 sl nl\hal yaa1.
Ca!culifion tlett1011 Dlsclos11re (cl.edc one option only-if nolll111 is d1ecbd, wa wili 11io llleUnifD,m Ta~le)
0 Umlom, raw (delaull)
D Joint Lile E,.peefancy Tllble; 01\11 avuilabk! when )'Our .$DIO Primi,y Pelll!f1claiy ii )'Ollr spouse wllo Js more l!la nlen OOJ }-ea,i younrc1 lhan )'DU

Section 9-NoUce of Federal lncome Tax W'ithholdtng un IRA OistribuUons and Federal Income Tax Wlthholdlng Eleotlon

the dislribu(bns}W ttteive l1oin a_o IRA a,e subje.;I fo wl\bholdlng for !oderal lnco111~ tax unlc,s ),JU elect nol ta ha~ wAhhololng u.Ptlr hr i:bl'Cklnr the 19p111prlale b~ on
lhls form. You 111a7 ilto oleet lo bave wlllrhclulii11 from )0:111 diSfllb11tlon by mteki119 llleapp1opial11 bot and lndledtne either to~. a dlffurcnt p~tt!lllaee. n, a II.red dollar
amounL If noeltctlo11 ls m11de. lede1al lncoll\Q ta, l'lrll be wi111b~ld fl'OIII ytiut dislrlbutle>tl it a nit bf l 0~. Yourttlttfion vn'II bD a~plled 16 all subsoqwnl lltU!o-uU~s
and IYfllamaln mfiled unlih'OUrMl!ai II (nwrilina, toch;ngtorreYO!te W\ltolDetion,cc11tacJ)Wr nnaneial AllvlscrorPdvatcW°'hb Advtsor, llt1111cfact nol Ii> haw
v. llhhOldrni: applf or Ir }'Ou IJo nol have eno11eb wijhhold, t'OII ma7 b~ r~ponsiblo for paymrml ol usllmatcd fe.i. You may !nc1,1r pcnsrll~ undtr Illa eslimalaf !mule, ii )WI
riilhholdi11g ~deslimaled lupaymt11ts arc not sufiic:lqif,
even 11 ycu e=I 1101 to hm lnlfeml fn~me tu w11l1lll!ld, Jllll Jre liable fp, payment al flllfml l11C01110 l11x u11 yoir IRA dlstrlbouons. YOI.I olso mar be sutjecl lo 1ai
pen11Ules un!'ler esllmolcd lax payme1U 1ufes if ~011r pay111tnl of ~ur:slimaled lox and willrhoUlng, Uanf, a1e 1101111equn1e to cover lhe lneome lai.11 )'llll t[{f:l lo ha~
,~11c1a1 fncomr Iii wlU1Mfd, )UII slate of resilfenr:o moy arso 1cqoi~ !bat $lale i11Co11Zll lai b11\lllhl1eld,
(Chl!CkDllef

,

b!l Oo nol r.'IPdlOI~ lcdMO( {IIC()llll! Int or
0 VnlhhOld l8Wal lnalltl!! lai tro,a rnr IRA dlslnbuliPtl n lollllm1
◊

.◊
◊

0

ID% of £IOU dlslri~utlOII .
P11tCC11l;go of arorr dislnbllUon ••

r~ ~Oil~, amCJUnl $...

-··- •

••

ror\~rbalrc.1111~r.onlt,
◊ s,mo as sclr.cfed
◊ Hane

•• ,t.

•" (ffxelf paymenl onl~

IIIMISlalllOl(OII FOIUI,

RCTmACO~ID121l l/.t0121
Ar,t-1
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I

"'

..... ·

• •

•

~

.
.......' . - '
· ·seotl~~- T0:-7~Qtlo~. of state·rn·oonieJaic"Y,IH·h_hotdl1,1g on JR~ P(strlbutions arid sta·te lnconi(Tax Withholding El~cUop
3111At

·"

_.

...

'

IAA/l~t -• , •:1•

...

,

.... r-.'PtPI

·ln·c:ettilin slalcs,,me in~me-tu ean il~o bamlbleld brmithlicllsllibul111ns)'OI! riu:eM! ~m.an IRA. If ledcsalt-11of ~~bein, wlthheld,)'01! may,1so cfe,;l lo havo •
lho slcrlc lar tiilbh~ U·tllh~ J 11cicenl~ge ;f g,on cllslilllblloh W~-pcrccnla°Di'o( Ito (edcr~11ncome loi wilbJloldl11J, Certain slal~s requfr~ lllbl slafo ln~m, lax •
oe 1Y11hhl!lO from-ywr dMdbullocr If you llave clecte'd 10 biVO loclenl in:pmr.tli,x vdl~hC!d, OlhCI ,falos may aUow y611 lo lr&lv6 \Yilhholdilli on I~ smo hvel land sliff ·
•IIIU~o/d IMe<.J jnCPm~l1d by m11klng lltii ekctioq cm.llt~ Fpr111~/.af ot chtcklnr lhe iPP!&P~ale bo:.on lhti lo<~ Your d~n wiU.bt ap11lied.\o Ill ,'U~~c~llf.lll ,dis•
lfib111io11s and will ctl!lifn· in 'eUect until lW 1C\rol'.o ii in rmlice. Sinco tl~iblo stales hart val)'ine eullltli11cs and 111lnim11ms for rdlhbolrlin& )\1U s!l,11fd ,era fo wllh•
hnlding 1eeri1,1rons !01 )'DUI stolr: 11n~/r1 consult with a lax advisor. .
• •
tven if )'OU oltel ool lo ha\111 lcideral lllCOmc laxwibheld, )'(IP Hr; !itblt fGr poymcnt ol l~e1il ine<Wo tax tii JDUI IRA dishibuli0/1:. You ~I~ moy bo tubJccl to lvr;
ptnall ieJ under e.stim~cd lat pa7mcnt rulc:5 IC )Our payr,11:tit of )'01lt es\imalrid lu.ond wilbl1old!ng, i[ a,17, are rot adequate ro cover lht Income fax. If~ elect to hov,
federal lru:ome lax wlth~e!d1 )'Ollf state ol rtsfdtnce may arso req11irc thal stale lntOIIIC la1 Ix> whllhtld.

(c""k ooe)

·

rzj Oo nol wil~hvld Jlale l~onu: tn Pf

0

0

Vlilllllold 5l8le lncol!le lax fmn my lflAclisblbbl~n U lollrTnS1
0 Pcrc~nla&e of e1oss dlslrlbulion ~ ••••• ·-··. _ • ~ _ •• ~
· (> JloCC!nl1£bof fsd!,al wilhbola111e,__ .. • •• • • _. ,_ • _,%
◊ r11~da!lm~u11I}, •• _, __ -.. - • (fixcdparmcnl"'111t.

foiVe1balleaues1son'1t
◊

S~mu, stlscltd

◊. Ilona

section 11-Payes Gertlffeauon and IRA owner or Beneficiary Sl,gnature
Dr reiding and sr2111nr U1iscerflll~llon. Itep101e111 and warrant as fcllriw.s1

e on that inl11mc1fou, a11d o; , tC$Uls of !his dlr~lion
~
~

~

~

~

~
~

ti
6

~
~
Morgan Slanfci-( anlf as aUilialot ,irona~ 1IWCl!llmC11d fbel fax1SUII mr In wlrJgaJ advisor pri,t lo comple11iin 011dsicntn1 lhif IQfll\

.

~

~

~

t-1

. .l9l

(J

ror illCCl111ctaxpllfP)ses, a111and allste11n1las disllib11led ln-tJndwiRbew!ued asol llieclostof bUsinmOl\l\l11by eathasv.115 0mn'bu\cd.
ldorc-,11. SIJ/lltywDI pio:c#roortc~IIC$( ,u-GOO es prutlcol"Beeau:ic LhtdiMbri{'lllll wlll 11111 comrru:nco vnta s0tnelim, ,n~ )"'I 1ig11 your rc~UC$I, lhenluci cf raur
• lltA omi1.; ano IG,table e111oun1s betnr dh1nb11l~ map Ylf'/ f1om Umlr ~mnt vatus du11 lo 1na1id llucl1,1a11uas 1mdfllarJan S11nl9)'\Tl0 not b11 ·mponsibl~ for ~ny riiatllct
lluctualfons l!Blcesultln II higherocfowerliltJlhlB infOlllC loyW ~riseol lbe flmiuf u(llleeilsldbullon of)"DUI StCUrillcs.
• · V.erbat Clk1noulloo Atrthotl~on:I hetebycetlirytny lele~hane !Aslruclltrii.s 2wcn purSllanl lo lhis aulhorizalio11 and atrce IJor1a11 Slantey_Mll nol be lbble Im all)' losses
' cew~ int rr,111 un~ulhorllod l1111sacllo11s II ii lol!owr 1e,sonabla pio:ed11tts dntiptd to w1il)i llia 1;1llcr. Iu11d111s1a1nJ thAl I 111t1 rl!S(lORSiblc 101 any CIIIISIX[leir:es CP.$Ull!ng
from thlS dBlrlbulion ~lufng to#$ 4n,j 9eninl0$0\'l11~. Hll11cmnll)' and hold Morg&I\ Stanlc)' ond 1ruffifiblt$ l1Dtn1bs IICIII any1cs11llln~ li1bi61lo,. IWl®'.flilld t~ I
•!Ills au1111nlraUon r,111 be effective tmlJh'rritlca n,v~trottor moi1m~atim Is nlQ!ive(I ~yMotcort.$(allle)' ll~ul111i11ulng lllis ptM1cgc, \\fddlGVcr ~s lilSI. Internal r,ansren
to ~ooOier Norean Slanloynon-1ctiremtn1 aecounl ,eqillre Ille IRAPMic,~ nao1a •n~ tax fdeollfltallon numl:e! ma1ch lllll r6lail ata1.111L MY changos to \Yllh!lolplng ce11ull~
WtAll:ll ,uu10riufian b'/ compl~linB - ~, dlslribullilA rarin.
•
• Direct. D11tosl1: I•ulhania M~nSlanley to ifeposi my ie!ilemonl uco1111l payment lnlc, Ill,
deslgn1!ed RCCL1U11I. My n11!orlralio4 wUJ remain lq errect unlft chinte4
• 01 ravobd !11 \V111iao. heD111plal• illformtliGn llllf allccl J11ocvnlnr and may d11~VQT proved lhuc,~pl of p17rno11~ Sliwkl 1111 inc.cureJ?I Ralln!ment~nl l'it'ffllllll be
d~~ilw lv mr bzi11\aetW11\.\o cllllf. hu\ho1at\b~ U1rn 1owilhdrm the elllDUnl fro111 mr m011n1 onlf e nc11 n,llrarn~ Aimml f'a)'llllllll iss11td 10 m11 !n 11s plut'C'. Shautd
awlthdmYil.lt0mlllfbccoun\not~poss,11fe.1wn1prompU,relrob11rscM11121ns1a11lcyf0unys~hpo)111L'i1l.
• 7WJ Represeniauons: I ~C'kaar,-!ed2e (al Ihaw recei\led o, hsd 1111de,nilable. !ho Mct2a11s1onlrr1 72<U calcul,101 lo pml& dislri&ulilllls as \!iCll as IMM«ean S!Jnley
'"A Gulde to tal:fltP. 12CQ D1$$rfbullons from v~ IRA;' (b) Ia111 nooollrolcn solclvruponsiblc 101 th, deciston fD !Mm sidl dfslribulion as YtCII as dcletmlnine Ill! a1>11ro~rlar~
maU1od and fnl~l ,~111, and (cl I unl!ersta nd that 11 It;ill 10 ro11o,t II» fmoquiremen(,·t wm be responsible tor All eidsu11d rncame bt liahiilics relbh4 la ;nth l~fkue.
and that 411 lh~ early dislr
st mir fio,~iniulrfci:.nl IRA 11$fflS In th~ ruJut11 lof11nd fulluo rctiiernenl neads.

•*

1

~JJQ6__._2 _
,SecUorJ 12-Gomplex Manager or Other c~mpl;x Manag~ atia!Hied Delegate Stg11alure (require<I for 72(0 dislribuUons onM
~bi(et C:C,.ffllWJr.«roaOllWl'iiiiliiw.1r:-"

•

•l'jllfl IWll 91 fflf'IU~flCIJOINIIIIO DmGIJ(" --

..
•

:

.

.'

I
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Morgan Stanley

IM\W ..

IRA Djstribution Form

.....

Section l .!-fRA Type: lil Traditional IRA D Rolh IRA □ SEP/SAR-SEP IR~
Section 2-Payee forormation: '□-1RAOwner 0 8er~fic1af}'

q_s_lMPL£ IRA,:

Q !nherlfcd IRA
s2

JodyMaHer\£1
1:1,1,1[

• •

a . 3 1 • a a a 1'

\'OCW.stcURll'I' f!WJi~R •

2170 Vimont Ave

• 'j

t

0!31021.1974

mo~LS'S Sall l..a~o Clty ·
6n .. · · ' .

DAll~ClfUII

UT

' 84109
1ii. ··

SIME

Sectjon 3-.- Reason for Distribution Request (select on~)

Under Aga 59½ (penalty may 8pply)
·
·
·
· · overAf8 59 ~
0 lwrmal Oislnoution
0 r,emaluro Dislribullon ·
D 7211) SubslanUally Equal PeriDdic Paymenls
.
(also complete Section 6)
• •
Other-Additional Do~umentation May be Required
Ill ·Death or Account Owner (Cer11rled Dealli CmtificBte and Notarized Affidavllof Oomlcile and Uebls r!Qukad fo, lnlUal disldbullon only. Nol reauircd for lnhnrlled IRA>
Trust and Estate S11nefich11tes mvsl provide addilionot 4ci~umen111Uon.

D Direct Ro!lovec to aau,rrricd Retirement Plan (Attach qualiliod pla11 feller of Bmptence)

(for E:dcrnaf llollover$ ordy, also provide Pl&n Namo and Address below, Uto this form tor chock$ onfy)

O Rotund or Excess Contzlbullon Tux Ye~, ••• ·
rdnclpa! $.
O Divorce {Attach Hnsl Divorce Decree and supporting property seltloment}

l ..

y

.

,

D Dlsabfflty

Earnings$

..

.:

Section 4-Payment Amount and Frequency (check all that apply). ·

Paymen\ Amount

O EnlireA10011nt Cash

0
0

·

•

·

.

Frequen~y

D OrossAmount:$

0 One-lime Pt11tlal Payment

0 Rci:urring: • Sla1I Dalin ~O Monlhlr O Quarterlr O Scmian1111oll~ 0

ln-l<In~ (Use tho grid providtd llolowi allach additional sheols Uneodcd}
A1l lncot110 rocelved Into fu;counl

Annutlly
II thrs recurring p11yn11ltll I~ for Al,IIl)-RMO, check lhis box 0

17-} Account Termination

,

. .

and illso complolu Sechon 8.

0 V.erbal Distribution AullTOr1zatlon (VD Ah

•

· · ··

:

Vatlable amorml a11d dlslribulinn delivmy molhrid In bo dolcrmlnod by 11te accounl holder ror each pafmenL I aulllorJl(I Mor~an Slonlny Sntilb Barney llC (~!dor11a11 S(anloy") I
lo ai;cept ve,bal requesls for 1hese amaunls Ont Imay make r,om liina to lime. Iunder$land"that verbal cfislribt1Hons ruquire awilhbolding eleclion mat will be u~ed rD( all ·
future verbal dislrlbutio~. My changes lo withholding require written autl111rJzalilln by complotlng &new dlstr!bullon form. Internal Transfers la anal her Mwga11 Slanlcy nDll-;

retirement ar:counl require i4Pl lho IRA owner's numa and lax r~ enlllfcallon number mulch U10 retail a~ounl, Vorbal dlslrlbuUans Gan b11 proc:essod JI In cash, via c~eck ur wfre
out. 2} AClf QUI rn mh lo the IRA owner's exlemal bank account or 3J cash or in-kind vla an Internal jouro~l lo tho IRA QWns(.s Marean Stonfey non-retirement account.
'

List Speciflo Assets ,a.. KJnd:

I

•
Name or Securny or lr~dln2 Symbol

' Quantity (iham/u1\lts}

Section 5. . . . . Method or Distribution (check all that apply) .
0 A\ltl!mofed.Cl1eck1Senl(o legal 11dt1ress on rectml)
.
.

D Che~klssuedlolRAowneral;itancrna(eaddros,1
• •·

•

11-} lnlefnal Jo11rnal (Requires lhal lho IRA Dwnor be an aulhorired signer on lho receMng retail

account numbar)
0 lllll3113r;antih Chock ce~;t~mor pl~-llp only)
~ Clod\t \q Morgan S\aaley accotCnl num~~n \-cil\ ..
r:;J fed funll·W,se·T(af\stec (f\\1'5ch Wlf6 Trsns(e( Request ro1m1
0 Cradll 10Morgans_1ante1acco.un1 num~r;
·
·••
◊ Credi! to Mt>rga11S1anleyaccoun1 number:
.
Direct Deposit via ACH fo my bank or credit11ni011 account mimed below. Wot avoirabfe foi'dtccn!cd or Inherited r/tAsJ
for chocki.ng s~counl& afi11ch ovoide~ check. DO NOf SEHO Ol!POSIT TICKETS

QC\~ii\J> ..

0
(

)

Account lypo (cli.eclioiw--cJ-C:heclling Er a~ngs
I.Ul[fl8AIIIC

!Wll'SA!IA IIUl.!DCI/A!Olllllil1 //Ul'GDI IV.115! Dt 9DIGllSJ

Ill lllllllllllllfllmlllm~ l l Jl

etiD111$l,CCOIJIIJ /j{O.IJICR

IRA 0/STR!BllJIOll FORM

R[JIRACO tll0l2 (l JJWJ?.J

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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e,ai:cnr

"IRAA~vnlf

Se~tion 6-72(l} substantially Equal Periodi~ Payment~-Dlstrib4tion Calculation

.

PlEASE ALLOW ATLEAST 15 '3USIHESS DAYS roa YOUR FIRST 72{() Dl$TRIBUTIOH TO BE PROCESSED, YOU ARE RESPDHSlBLEFOR THE IHTERM RATE
AHO tHf: OISllllUUTIOH METHUO CROSE!{. · · •
.
.
NOTE: 72(0 dislribulions.. once begun,.musl i:onlinue unchanged 1mm ~ee 59» or for five years, whicbevor is latcr. lhese payme11ts· wnt conlfnuc unlH
we ,eceivo wrilten no(lll~lion lo i;ant;d them.
Plnase soleef your distribution melllod bth>w.
(iJ
Life ~P\,aclancr/reQulrod minimum dls~lbuUua melbod
•. 1 • • • • • , • :
•
•.
•
•
•
The dlstrlbulion amotlll\ wi11 be calculaled ;nnusllyand will b1rbasod on lhe prio, yoar-emfvaruo, dMded by the me at~eclincy method chosen:.

.

p

O s;ngle ur~

D Joint Life

IC )'OUr Joint

Cif'B expectancy is scleclod, wo will tis¥ Iha henaf(cla,y lnformiliDn cummlly un fllo wilh us. To nsmo orchsnga bend!da,y informaUon,
plcaso complete M fRh 003lf,11al!on ol Benellciaiy fomt,
•
•

lnleresl Race •
%
O Annual ComooundinP.
D Oilier Compa11odi11g
lnlercsl fble
o/o
O Annuill Comooundin,
0 OU1erOompovnding
ror (iii and Oli} abn\'O, !he IRS rcquiro, that a "rcaso1111blP" lnloresl rote be used, "Reasonable.. is defined as between 80% ond 120% oflho federal mid-lorm rate.as
announced monlllfy by tho IRS under Code secllo11 J274(d), for ellher of (he two (Z) months prccedlnir Ifie ljlollth in which lhe llislriputioll ~sins.
D oiised on exisling 72{1)_ schodule slartod on • • • ., (rmfen'Cd in from
. t111t11roo~~C11S1iiaim.s~
(ii)

lliil

fj

O /unqrlizaliQa MclhQd
O Ann11itii~llo11 Method

Section 7-0eath Benefit El~ctlon
O Rollover lD spDUse's IRA D Lump sum · 121 nansf11 lo lnheriled IRA to pay uver boneficlaiy's
:···

single die expectani:y orappllcable Ille tiXpectancf

O nalisforto Inherited IRA to par our

within 5yean OflRA owner's ~ealh

08/02/1974

'0410§1201$

UU.f'AAIICPN«'SOJJC oioam

ii~ombro1Rm

.Section 8......:. Required Minimum Distributions {"RMD") (check One} Select your payment frequency in Section 4.
0 AIJTO•RMO {aul1>malfcally pay$ out lhaexacl amDullll

•

·

• II you elect AUTO•RMD, lha eni:lnmoun\ ot )')I.Ir 111muoJ IIMO will b~ pafd out aulcmo1icolly, ff you choose lhis llplion, vie vtill pllJr&lo your remaildng RMO amount over lha

,

temaJnlng poclltm vr Ihls~1end11ryearfor mh year therootre, we wlll call:ulale your RMD &nll llstnbulo It over lho enlfro year base~ oo tha lrequem:y selected in Seelftin 4.
This elpctlon will remi!in In effecl until vte receivo updated fnstrucllons ftoni you to do olhDSWlse. for calclllatlon p~rposes, if AUfO•RMD I; checke~ the 4Cli!UII cafcul~t1on
will use lho Unifo~ ta bl&. RM~ for the yoar oflhe IRA ownor's doalh musl ~ paid out by Oecomber 31st of lhal ~aL •
·
&~ltulatlon Elecllon O_lsclosure {cfleckQllO opti~n only::-11 nellherls <:becked, w~ will u~e the OnJform re~la}
•
D uolform Tobie (dcroull)
.
•
O Jornt Lile Expectancy labl0: only a~allabl~ whe{I your sole Primary BcpefiC!alY ~s your spouse who Is mare Than ten nOlyem youniertb!n you
SPOJ!Sl l!CXO 1&wirsmcw. sccu;nfouvsiR

~MLOlffUICl/,llrto~ito/BIIIIH.

Section 9-Hotlce of Federaf Income Tax Withholding on IRA Distributions and Federal lnoome Tax Withhofding Election

TIie dlslrlbullons you re-ceivo rrom an IRA aro subJecl lo withholdinf for·feder.al illtome lax uidess you eleclnot lo ho\'11 wllhholdlng apply bycheckinf lht appropria!e box on
this form. Y11u may al~o elocl t~ havu willlh1>Jdlng lrom your dlstrlbuJlon by checking the 11ppropriale b.ox e11d lndlc,tlng 11Jlher 10%, a df((orenl pen:enlesa. or a fixed dollar
amouitl. ff no cl~tion I& made, fodoral inrome lmvlll ~o wllhheld frorn ye,ur dlsttlbullon al Brote or 10~. Your erecm,n-wilf b~ applied to:all subsequonl disldbulf Plls ,
and will remain rn effccl 1mlil you 1evoko ii in writing. To Chango or revoke your election, tnnlact ywr flnanctal Advisor orl'tl:vate Wealll1 M'l\~Gt. l(ytilJ e.lecl not 111 bave ,
wil!\holdlng i\PQIY pr ihou do_{U)l !\a~e cnoueh mlhhnld, you may be responsible l<1r payment Qi estimated 1at. You ma1 fn.~ur ponalli~ undct Ule eslimaled tax rules if yo~,
wilhholdlng and eslirriafed tax p:iymonls aro 1101 S1Jftlciei1t.
•
•
·
Evttn JI you oloct nof IPJ ~avb (odorol fncomc lax wllhhcld, you are lloblo for peyrnonl of fe~ml Jncl)me lax on Your IRA dfslrn,u·uons, Yau abo l'l!W be tubi11~ lo tax
panal(ie$ uridet estima(ed tax payinon( rulet II ywr payment or fDlll ll$llmatcd tax and wJlhhDllflng, II any, a10 not adequale fo cover Iha lneome'lax. IJ you cl~l lO bm
federal lr,::ome 10,: withheld, your sla1e or rcsldcnctl may also require lhalStato income lax be wllhh&ld.
· {chock ano) •
•
•
.
•
0 Do not wilhhol~ federal lncome Iax or
□ Foe Verbal teQuests only:
EJ With hof~ fo~orulf11co~ne ,la~ rrom my IRA djsl~b.1111~ as rollovts: ., . • :
• ◊ Same ~s seJecfod
(). J0% of eross Cllslrlbt1ll11n
•
◊ tlonn
◊. PcrCl!nlaee of eross dislribulion .,

t

--·

-========<►>-~-_.f.lxod."dollar-amountt_

. .

.. '% •••
==1.IJ!@,;Jl.ij'.1119.nl'f].nb:1=========ic=================

.·

.. ·-·

.

IRA l)ISIRl8U11011 FORM
RITIRM!D Hl 011 ll l/20J.21
Pltt'IKt
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Section 10-Notice of State ·,~~ome Ta~ Withholding on IRA Distributia~s ~nd State inoome :raK:Withhofding E(eotion,

(fl wtai11 sla(es, sfalo income iai csn also 6e \\'llhhald·(rom the di$fribulions you wcl!lve from an 1RA: 1r fedoral t11x~ .are bo!ng Wlthl1eld, you may also oletl lo nave 1
1be stale tax f(lfhhe[d as ellhe, 9 percenlaee a1 fl'OSS dlsrrlbullan Gt palt'antaeut the federal income f~ ~vilhlmlding. Certain wif~ requ(re that slato Income lax
be.withheld from )'llllr dislribuUon U)'Ou !rave olccled Io hilVO. f~deraf Income lax wlJhfmld. Olhet stales may olJow Yo" !o \nivq Mfhholdin~ 011 llio sta.l~ levJl(and stiff

a

wilhhold r~doral inrom6 lal) by maki11g this etectipn on. IRS rQrm W:4P 9r chccklne lho appropn.~~ box on lbls l6rm. ypur el~ctJop wl II b\ applie4 td all siJbscqui:n\ di$~
tributions and will remain In eflecl urttil yvu revoke ll in w1lllng. S{11ce eITeibfe ita(es l1ave val)ine 1illdelines aod 'minimums for wilh~oldfn2. you sho1dd ref er lo wilh•
holdlng rogulallons for your sfa!e flnd/or consufl wilh II tm1dvlm
·
· • ·• ' • • · ·
•
.
fven Uyo~ e!ecl not ta t111v& {odoral lntome ~ax wllhh.Dld, you are liable for p~ymeni of ledetbl Income lax on ~t1rJRA dlsl!l~uuoiiJ, Yov also may b4 subjucl _(o lu ·
penallles undtir esllma!ed tar paymBr'II ro(es II yourpoyment of vn11roslima!ed lapmitwillltioldif!e, Ira~y. pte not a~eq~ajo lo co~r the lntome1ax. 11 ~oy elecl lo .h~ve :·
feder"l lntome tai wilh~efd, your st11!a ofresidencc qiay .also requlro lfial sh:llo !ttcomc lox be wllhhel(I. •
• · •• • •
• •
.
: :

{check onel

·• ·

it] DD no! .wllfth~ld stale f11come l;ax f!r

•

• ·
. . •

·

Porcenlago of BIOS$ dis{ribulion
◊ Porcentageol rederalwilltl1Dldln2
◊ Fixed doflar amount$. •

· '

··

Ys;bal
o~ly~·
• . ◊-s~n\hs •selet:led
¢· ffono· •

·

O Wdhhold state In tame laxfroin my IRA disldboJl~n OJ lollows:

· ,◊

·

.

~

•%

•• '

ni~

,~~~c~s

•

•· •

·

·

•' • •

· ••

%

..

(firfld payment cnlyJ ••

' Section t"t-Payee ~ertification and IRA Owner or Benetictacy.Slgoature

.

,

Sy rc~dine and &igning lhis cerUficalfon, lrepr~cnl and wasran\ a5 follows, • •
••
•
• ••
•
, Ice1tlly Illa! Ih11VD provided h101ga11 Slanleyrn'th conccl lnf~1malfon. and I-under.stand l11al a distrl~ullon or dlstrlootrons will be made (rom my Morgan Stanloy IRA bssed

on ll!alinformatton. and as a result of lhlsdirecfiori . •
.
, Icartdy lhi!I U~s dis ltltl~llon reqii~t ls In a~cotda nee with the p1Dvisions of Ihe IRA and ulistios appl!cab_lo fcde1al and sla}e.faw!~q~ircmenb
, 1undeutand \hat Iam responsible loc maintaining sufticJent mh or inalkel able securlt1es in my acccunt to support lbose dlstribul\ons ·..~ I~ndersland fhal Morgan Slan ley, fts affiiales and N'iirgen Slanll!Y Filianclal Advisors and Private Weanh Adviso,s d111io( pro\Jl de lax or lega Iadvice, and Iha!
Morgan SlanlB)' a.nft _ils alflllalcs ~lrongly recommend lh~f Icon,ull my lax or. legal advisor p1ior lo C"Omplo~ng end signing (hi$ fo1m
~ Ihl!leby indemnify and hold ha ,m Im· MP1JJa11 Staftley and lb affillilos.f ur-any tai corisel(Uences oflhi's dlslrfoollon reQuesl and U1e eleetlohs-inadnbwe
, Mol'l!on Stanley may roly on my ecttillcatlo11 wll~oot further lnwsUgatlon ar inquiiyand $hall JIDl be ll1blc lcr any mlsrePl~anliliM or lacl
For lnt"OntB lax purpOSes, 11ny and an S1!CU1UI~ dislrU>ulod in-kind wm bo YDlucd os al the clo~ of business oo Ille day ea,h assel Is 1Ustrlbtlled.
Morgan Staz1f,:r wm proeeiowr roquosl D~ $0011 as p,sctlcal Because lhe disbibullon will nol commen'8 unlll $amclime aneryou s!gn your request, l~e valtie cl yur,r
IRA assets and taxable amc111ils being distributelf may Viii)' from lhetr cwre11t value due to m111kel Uud.ua\i0ns ind Morgan S\anle,wllt nol b11 respnnsiblll (or any ma1kel
-:
rlucfuallons that ,esulC in a hieher or IOWQr taxable 111co1n11 to YQII beci11J$e ol lhe llmio11 or Ille disllibullon ol rcurset1unros.
, •Yerhal Disttilnit!on Aolhomallonr IICl!feJri'Gorutyanylelophonc lnsfruclions given pu,suanl lo this anlhcrimlfon and pgroe M01cnn Slenfeywlll nol be li&b!~ for;111y Im~
resulting Imm unaulhOriz~ transaclions if it IDIIDWS teasonable p,ocedurcs deslened to verify (he callet I11n~erstand Ihat Iam rosponstble lo, any ro11seQue1!Cfl$ resulting
• from this dislribuUon incl11d!ne (am!I .and penallil!S owned. findemnib' and hD!d Mllrean S!anlO'I and ft! affllletss barmleu from :any r0$ulli11g liobililiot. rundurslend·lhaf.
lhis aiithorizslfon wm becffocUY& u11lilwlillC!O rcvooalicn ormediticalion ls teeeived tr,,MorganStan18'/dfsconUnulng (his p,:fyilege, whlthoveroccw$ frrsi fntamaJ Trpn~~rs
to another Morgan Stanlqnon-nitlremeltl account roquire Uio fM owner's namo· and lax·IOenUr11.alfo11 numbur malcb the rclall ocw1J11t. /..ny changes lo wilhhol~!i1g ,~quire:
\Yritten authorltalion b't com~etine a neir, disfrib!llion form,
··•
•• ,
! Olroot. (}eposll: Iaul hori1eMor~ nStanleylo dcpOsil my reli~enl account payfllcll1 inlo lho a~ow d~ignafcd eccounl. My 11utharilatl,;n Will remain In effect 1111111 changed
• or revoked k1 writing, lnccmplelc lnrorroaUon may artect prorosslng and may delayo, prevent the receipt of paymcnlt, Should an lntorrcel Rc1t111me111 J\cepunt Paymont bo •
doposlled to my bsnk occ011nl In onor, l 11uU1orire tho linn lo withdraw the amount from my account and a new ReUromenl Ac-count Payment Issued ID me In its place. Shoold
avri{hd<awal Crom my acµiunl ool be possible. Iwill prompll, rclmbul'$e Mo1g1m SlB11lcy IM 1my~uch payment,
·
• 72(11 Re11mentatlom; IatknCYtd&dg~ (aJ Ihave received or had made avall116!0 Ille Morean Slan(cy n(I) calculator lo fllVVkle disbibullons as welt as llla Morgan Slanley r
"A Guide lo Taking 72(t) Oislifbulio11$ (tom your IRA:' (b) I am 1111nelllelms solalyresponsl~le Collhe declsiqn ID lake such distribuf!Qn ti$ well a~ d~leiminlng Iha appropriate
rnelhod and intern:~! rate, and (cl I understand lhal II If11!1 to fotbwtho lax requifCIJ!onls f will bo ,vsponslble {or.atl'elclso ond !nco1110 t8l( llabililies relalcd lo IDCh failure,'
and mat by lfolng these ea1ry lfistrfbullons I may have fnSl.lftlclt!lll IRI\ assels in 1ne lulure to fond f11turo intil'ement nt!l!dS.
••
.• •
'

.

•'

.. ~~ctlon 12-Complex Manager or ~er Complex Manag@r Qualffled D.afegate Sfgnatum (req.uirad -1or 1i(t) dlsJrlbuU~ns.ooM
$11'.i:inPlt OI C:llloll'l.a 1,1111w'QIW,1,UlltP vdr r.All

IW(

fAlllltWJE.OFCOlllLO:W&GUt&.IDUJ.illlfD PlltCMC

CJ 201Zlilo1gnn Sinn!!)' Smllh 8omoyll0. ldeJ?btt SIPC.

Morgan Stanley

Ill/! DtSTRIBlJJIOH EORM
RalMCO NIOll }11/20121
• •

. :' ' .., ..

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

,

lhNiinc~

•

ADDENDUMC

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INSTRUCTION NO.

~

PUNITIVE DAMAGES
If you find fort~ Shellie Biesele and Melodie Jacobsen on any of their claims for fraud,
GGASF3ireey ~a eeRURit ire1:1rt breach of fiduciary duty or conversion, you may, but are not
required to, award punitive damages. The purposes of punitive damages are to punish

f Jody

Mattena and May Harris and to deter similar acts in the future.
Shellie Biesele and Melodie Jacobsen have the burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence that punitive damages should be awarded and, if so, the amount of any such
damages.
You may award punitive damages if you find that the Jody Mattena and May Harris's conduct
was willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct or.conduct that manifests a
knowing and reckless indifference towards and disregard of the rights of Shellie and/or
Melodie.
If you find that punitive damages are appropriate, you must use reason in setting the amount.
Punitive damages, if any, should be in an amount sufficient to fulfill their purposes. In
considering the amount of any punitive damages, consider the degree of reprehensibility of

t/e

Jody Mattena and May Harris's conduct.
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DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY
SHELLIE BIESELE and MELODIE
JACOBSEN, individuals,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case Number 140902798
Judge Matthew Bates

vs.

JODY MATI'ENA and MAY HARRIS,
individuals,
Defendants.
Before the Court are two motions: Defendants' Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict Regarding Punitive Damages and Plaintiffs' Motion
for Award of Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Expenses. Both motions have been fully
briefed. The Court heard argument from the parties on September 19, 2017, and
took the motions under advisement. Having fully considered the moving papers,
relevant facts and legal opinions, and argument from counsel, the Court DENIES
the Defendants' motion and GRANTS the Plaintiffs' motion.

I
The instant claims arose from the death of Ms. Thomas ("Ms. Thomas") and
the subsequent disbursement of her estate. Two components of that estate, a
Morgan Stanley IRA ("the IRA") and the Raylene M. Thomas Family Living Trust
("the Trust"), were at issue. Plaintiffs were Ms. Thomas's stepdaughters and
Defendants were Ms. Thomas's natural daughters. Plaintiffs claimed that
Defendants improperly spent trust funds before Ms. Thomas's death, influenced her
to write Plaintiffs almost completely out of the trust, and failed to properly disburse
the proceeds of the IRA to them. After a five-day trial, the jury resolved all of the
claims in Plaintiffs' favor and awarded them economic and punitive damages of
$925,666.38.

Defendants ask this Court to overturn the jury's verdict on punitive damages
and grant them a new trial on the amount of punitive damages. They claim that
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the Court erred in not bifurcating the punitive damages question from the questions
of fault and economic damages. They also claim that the punitive damages award
was wrongly based, in part, on a breach of contract claim and that when the award
is properly limited to just the tort claims, the award is excessive. Defendants do not
contest the jury's determination that punitive damages were appropriate. Rather,
they argue that the amount was excessive and made without evidence of the
Defendants' respective wealth or lack thereof.
As a threshold matter, the Defendants' motion is more properly construed as
a motion for a new trial under Rule 59, not a motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict under Rule 50. A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is a
challenge to the evidentiary basis of the jury's verdict. It is properly granted when
a court finds that the jury did not have "a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find
for the party." Utah R. Civ. P. 50(a)(l). Because a motion for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict challenges the evidentiary foundation of a verdict, it is
made under Rule 50, and it is, in fact, a renewed motion for a directed verdict or
"judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 50(b).
Courts grant great deference to a jury's factual findings and do not overturn
verdicts lightly on claims of insufficient evidence. Motions for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict are granted only when "there is no 'basis in the
evidence, including reasonable inferences which could be drawn therefrom, to
support the jury's determination.'" ASC Utah, Inc. u. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C.,
2013 UT 24, 1 18, 309 P.3d 201 (quoting Braithwaite u. W. Valley City Corp., 921
P.2d 997, 999 (Utah 1996)).
Here, Defendants do not challenge the evidentiary underpinnings of the
jury's verdict. Instead, they attack the procedure by which that verdict was reached
and the size of the damages award. Such claims are more properly the basis of a
motion for new trial, and the Court will therefore treat Defendants' motion as such.
See Bair u. Axiom Design, LLC, 2001 UT 20, ii 9, 20 P.3d 388 ("[I]t is the substance,

not the labeling, of a motion that is dispositive in determining the character of the
motion.")
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Under the proper standard of a motion for a new trial, the Court may grant
the motion only if it finds an irregularity in the proceeding that prevented
Defendants from having a fair trial or if it finds the verdict or a decision is contrary
to law or based on an error in law~ See Utah R. Civ. P. 59. 1 Additionally,
Defendants must show that they were prejudiced by the alleged errors. "The court
at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the
proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties." Utah R. Civ.
P. 61.

II
Turning to the merits of the motion, Defendants claim that the court erred
when it refused to bifurcate the question of the amount of punitive damages. They
assert that Utah Code section 78B-8-201(2) mandates bifurcation of the amount of
punitive damages from the other issues in at trial. Specifically, they argue that a
jury must consider the financial conditions of the defendants when determining the
amount of punitive damages and that under section 78B-8-201 evidence of financial
condition can only be presented in a bifurcated proceeding. The Court disagrees.
Section 78B-8-201 states that evidence "of a party's wealth or financial
condition shall be admissible only after a finding of liability for punitive damages
has been made." It thus requires bifurcation when any party intends to put on
evidence of a party's financial condition as part of its claim or defense on the
amount of punitive damages. But neither section 201 nor Utah case law require the
jury to consider evidence of financial condition in making a punitive damages
award. In fact, the case law states the opposite.
The Utah Supreme Court considered this exact question in Hall u. Wal-mart
Stores, Inc., 989 P.2d 109, 111 (Utah 1998) ("The issue before us is simply a
question of law: Is the introduction of some evidence as to the defendant's relative
wealth a prerequisite to an award of punitive damages?") After considering some of
its prior statements on role of evidence of financial condition in punitive damages
Rule 59 describes several other grounds for granting and new trial, but none of
those apply to Defendants' claims.

1

3
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claims, the Hall court held that such evidence was not a necessary factor in
determining the amount of an award of punitive damages: "Although it is true that
some of our cases seemingly place great importance on evidence of relative wealth,
we have never held that an award of punitive damages is completely precluded in
its absence." Hall, 989 P .2d at 112. Instead, the court saw financial condition as an
important but optional factor that can be important in evaluating a post-verdict
challenge that an award was excessive. Id. at 112-13 ("[T]he plaintiff who fails to
introduce evidence of the defendant's relative wealth risks having an award struck
down on the basis of excessiveness.")
In this case, neither parvy proffered evidence of the Defendants' financial
conditions, nor did the parties seek to bifurcate the trial so as to allow evidence of
the Defendants' financial conditions. Instead, when defense counsel requested
bifurcation, he erroneously argued that bifurcation was mandatory in every
instance in which punitive damages were claimed:
One issue that Mr. Evans reminded me of is the punitive damages. I
believe there's a statute that states that you can ask the jury in the
special verdict form if punitive damages are appropriate, but you can't
ask them for the number. That's a bifurcated process and so you can't,
they need to come back in and be instructed on the issue, if they find
that they're appropriate.
The Court denied the request, explaining that bifurcation was only
appropriate when one party was seeking to introduce evidence of the Defendant's
financial condition:
You know, my understanding of the statute is that typically the only
thing you bifurcate on that issue is if there's an issue as to the wealth
of the defendants and whether or not the jury should consider that.
Last time I looked at the statute, it actually requires you to bifurcate
that issue during both the discovery process, I think, and the trial
process if you find it, but nobody's raised the wealth of the parties, the
respective wealth of the parties in this issue. So under the statute, I
believe the jury just decides that issue as a question, so ....
4
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Defendants never proffered evidence of their financial condition or argued
that bifurcation was necessary to allow them to present that evidence. Parties
cannot make motions or objections on one ground and then argue other grounds in
post-trial motions or on appeal. See Winward u. Goodliffe, 2011 UT App 292, 19,
263 P.3d 493 (refusing to review on appeal claim that evidence was not properly
authenticated, lacked foundation, and was hearsay where party had objected below
only on relevance grounds). Because Defendants never alerted the Court to their
desire to introduce evidence of their financial condition, the Court did not err in
refusing to bifurcate the case.
Additionally, Defendants have not demonstrated that they were prejudiced
by the Court's ruling. To show prejudice, the moving party must demonstrate that
absent the alleged error there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome. See Cerritos Trucking Co. u. Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d 608, 613 (Utah
1982) ("This Court will not reverse a trial court judgment merely because there may
have been error; reversal occurs only if the error is such that there is a reasonable
likelihood that, in its absence, there would have been a result more favorable to the
complaining party.").
Defendants have wholly failed to meet this burden. Finding prejudice in this
instance requires that the Court evaluate the impact of evidence of Defendants'
financial condition on the jury's punitive damages award. But Defendants have not
proffered that evidence. Even at oral argument, defense counsel was unable to
describe with any specificity his clients' financial conditions. Without such
evidence, the Court can only speculate as to what the evidence might look like and
how it might affect the jury's decision. The Court thus has no reason to believe that
bifurcating the trial would have made any difference in the outcome.

III
Defendants also claim that the punitive damages award was excessive. Their
argument on this point proceeds in two steps. First, Defendants assert that the
claims relating to the disbursement of IRA funds were not properly subject to a
punitive damages award because the claims sounded in contract rather than tort.
Next, excluding the damages awarded for the IRA-related claims, Defendants argue
5
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that the ratio of punitive damages to economic damages is 5.5:1-a ratio they claim
is presumptively excessive.2
The Court disagrees. Plaintiffs' claims to the IRA proceeds are properly
subject to a punitive damages award. And with those damages in the calculation,
the punitive damages award is not presumptively excessive.
As a threshold matter, the claims clearly sound in tort, not contract. The IRA
proceeds were held by Morgan Stanley pursuant to a contract with the decedent,
Ms. Thomas. And Morgan Stanley disbursed the IRA funds according to its
interpretation of the contract. But Plaintiffs did not sue Morgan Stanley for breach
of contract- they sued Defendants for three tort claims: breach of fiduciary duty,
conversion, and inference with an expected inheritance. To be sure, the jury had to
interpret the contract between Morgan Stanley and Ms. Thomas before reaching the
tort claims. But that does not convert the claims into contract claims. That
determination was merely a predicate question of whether Defendants had retained
money that belonged to Plaintiffs. The IRA funds were thus the subject of tort
claims that were eligible for a punitive damages award under Utah Code§ 78B-8201. Cf. Norman v. Arnold, 2002 UT 81, ~ 35, 57 P.3d 997 (noting that punitive
damages are allowed where a breach of contract amounts to an independent tort).
Defendants also claim that the wrongfully retained IRA funds should not be
subject to punitive damages claims because none of the torts alleged by Plaintiffs
include an element of willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct. For
example, Defendants argue that conversion "is essentially a strict-liability tort with
no mens rea element" and that "finding of conversion is not a finding of malice,
fraud, or wanton disregard for the rights of others." They also argue that a breach
of fiduciary duty "does not establish 'malice, fraud or wanton disregard for the
rights of others.' "
already explained, Defendants do not contest the factual sufficiency of the punitive damages
awards. The Utah Supreme Court has articulated seven factors to aid factfinders in determining a
punitive damages award, including "the amount of actual damages awarded." Crooliston u. Fire
Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 807 (Utah 1991). Defendants have not recited or analyzed the Crookston
factors, except for the amount of actual damages, nor marshalled the evidence to show how the jury's
awards are excessive under those factors. Instead, they rest their claim on one factor: the ratio of
punitive damages to actual damages. The Court limits its review of the awards accordingly.
2 As
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Defendants misconstrue the standard for determining whether a claim is
eligible for punitive damages. Punitive damages are warranted when it is
"established by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of the
tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct,
or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a
disregard of, the rights of others." Utah Code § 78B-8-20l(l)(a) (emphasis added).
Other than referring to a tortfeasor, section 78B-8-201 says nothing about the types
of claims that are eligible for punitive damages. Instead, it is the nature of the
defendant's conduct that justifies punitive damages, not the nature of the plaintiffs
claim.
Conversion and breach of fiduciary duty often involve simple mistakes or
negligence. But the Court can imagine myriad scenarios in which a tortfeasor
might act maliciously in converting chattel or breaching his fiduciary duty. Thus,
the fact that Plaintiffs did not allege claims relating to the IRA funds that involve
an element of malice or fraud is not a bar to punitive damages. 3
Having determined that all of the Plaintiffs' claims, and thus all of the actual
damages, are subject to punitive damages awards, the Court must now determine
whether the awards were excessive. "The ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages does not, by itself, determine whether or not an award is excessive; an
award that falls outside certain parameters will, however, elicit more searching
judicial scrutiny." Diversified Holdings, L.C. u. Turner, 2002 UT 129, 1 24, 63 P.3d
686. Utah's appellate courts have provided some guidance on ratios that are
acceptable and ratios that invoke more scrutiny. "For punitive awards of less than
$100,000 a ratio of three to one will generally be justifiable, but for awards greater
than $100,000, a somewhat lower ratio is usually appropriate." Id.

a Of course there must still be some evidence of malice or fraud in the Defendants' conduct to
warrant punitive damages. But, as already explained, Defendants do not challenge the sufficiency of
the evidence to support a punitive damages award. They never moved for a directed verdict on
punitive damages, and they have not marshalled the evidence and shown under the Crookston
factors how it is insufficient to either the existence or amount of damages. They claim only that the
ratio of actual damages to punitive damages in this case is presumptively excessive.

7
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In this case, each Defendant was sanctioned with a punitive damage award of
$308,555.46. The awards are in excess of $100,000, so a ratio of greater than 1:1
will trigger "more searching judicial scrutiny." Id. The jury awarded actual
damages against Defendant Jody Mattena of $273.536.30 and against Defendant
May Harris of $232,083.70. The ratio of punitive damages to actual damages are
thus 1:1.13 and 1:1.33, respectively.
The ratios in this case are slightly greater than 1: 1. But the Court is
unaware of any case holding that ratios of slightly more than 1:1 are presumptively
excessive. And the Court declines to engage in any further judicial scrutiny because
Defendants have given the Court nothing to scrutinize. They have not marshalled
the evidence and assessed it against the usual factors for determining the amount of
a punitive damages award. See Diversified Holdings, L.C. u. Turner, 2002 UT App
1291 12, 63 P.3d 686 (describing factors that aid a factfinder in determining the
amount of a punitive damages award). They have therefore given the Court no
reason, beyond claims of excessive ratios, to find that the awards are in fact
excessive. A district court has no duty to look beyond parties' memoranda to
identify arguments and supporting evidence buried somewhere in the record. See
Stichting Mayflower Mountain Foods u. United Parh City Mines Co., 2017 UT 42, 1
43, -- P .3d -- ("Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.,,); see
also United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991).
Because Defendants have not shown any prejudicial error or irregularity in
the proceeding, their motion for new trial is denied. 4

IV
Having denied Defendants motion for a new trial, the Court may now
properly address Plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees. To resolve this motion, the
Court must first determine whether Plaintiffs are entitled to fees under Utah Code
4 The result would be the same under the standard for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Because the jury was not required to consider the financial conditions of the Defendants in
determining the amount of punitive damages, and because Defendants have not proffered what
impact evidence of their financial conditions would have on the jury's verdict, the Court cannot say
that there is no basis in the evidence for the jury's punitive damage award.
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section 75-7-1004(1). If the Court determines that Plaintiffs are entitled to fees, it
must then determine a reasonable fee.5
In a judicial proceeding involving a trust, Utah Code section 75-7-1004(1)
authorizes a Court to order any party to pay costs and expenses, including
reasonable attorney's fees, to any other party "as justice and equity may require."
The phrase "as justice and equity may require" suggests fairness and flexibility in
awarding costs and fees as needed on a case by case basis. See Shurtleff v. United
Effort Plan Trust, 2012 UT 47, 123,289 P.3d 408. And the Utah Supreme Court
has suggested several factors for lower courts to consider in determining what
justice and equity require. Id. Those factors are (1) the reasonableness of the
parties' claims, contentions, or defenses, (2) whether one party unnecessarily
prolonged litigation, (3) the parties' relative ability to bear the financial burden of
litigation, (4) the result obtained by the litigation and prevailing party concepts,
and (5) whether a party has acted in bad faith in the bringing or conduct of the
litigation. Id.
In the instant case, the first, fourth, and fifth factors dearly weigh in
Plaintiffs' favor. Plaintiffs prevailed on all of their claims and received the full
measure of damages that they sought. They also received a substantial award of
punitive damages. Thus, Plaintiffs claims were reasonable, they clearly prevailed,
and Defendants acted in bad faith.

s Plaintiffs also claim that fees for the IRA-related claims are allowed under the well-established
exception to the American rule for claims of breach of fiduciary duty. See Kealamahia, Inc. u.
Kealamakia, 2009 UT App 148, 17,213 P.3d 13 (noting that fees are recoverable in claims of breach
of fiduciary duty). Because the Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled under section 75-7-1004(1) to
fees for all of their claims, it unnecessary to address Plaintiffs' alternative theories. Defendants
concede that the "vast majority of discovery and trial time was dedicated the Trust claim." (Def s
Memo. in Opp. to Pl's Mot. for Award of Att's Fee, Costs, and Expenses at 9.) And May Harris
testified that she removed the funds from the IRA and placed them into the trust where they were
subsequently spent. The Court thus need not separate out fees for the trust claims and fees for the
IRA claims because, according to Defendants, so little effort was spent on the IRA claims. Moreover,
the claims clearly overlap. See Dejauue, Inc. u. U.S. Energy Corp., 1999 UT App 355, ii 20, 993 P.2d
222 ("[W]hen a plaintiff brings multiple claims involving a common core of facts and related legal
theories, and prevails on at least some of its claims, it is entitled to compensation for all attorney
fees reasonably incurred in the litigation.")

9
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The second factor does not weigh in favor of either side. Both parties
conducted extensive discovery and filed substantive pre-trial motions that delayed
the ultimate resolution of the case. The case went to trial a little more-than three
years after the complaint was filed, which, sadly, is not an unreasonable time for a
case of this complexity.
With respect to the third fact, the relative ability of the parties to bear the
financial burden of litigation, neither side has proffered any evidence about the
relative financial conditions of the parties. The Court thus does not consider this
factor.
Weighed together, these factors demonstrate that justice and equity demand
an award of attorney's fees in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendants. In
relation to their mother's estate, Defendants lied, hid assets, misused and
misappropriated trust funds, and failed to provide any meaningful accounting of
their stewardship. Under such circumstances, Plaintiffs should not have to bear
their own attorney's fees.
There thus remains only the question of a reasonable fee award. A trial court
has substantial discretion to calculate a reasonable fee. See Dixie State Bank v.
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). In considering the evidence, the court does
not look only at self-serving affidavits of counsel seeking the fee. Id. Instead,
courts consider a variety of factors, including the difficulty of the litigation, the
efficiency of the attorneys, the hourly rate or fee customarily charged for the work,
and the novelty or difficulty of the issues. Id. at 989. The fee requested by counsel
is thus a starting point, and the court may depart downward from that point based
on its evaluation of the evidence. Id. at 988.

Dixie State Bank established a four factor test that "as a practical matter"
courts should consider when determining the reasonableness of a fee: (1) the legal
work that was actually performed; (2) the amount of work that was reasonably
necessary to adequately prosecute the matter (3) the attorney's billing rate and
whether it is consistent with the rates customarily charged in the locality for
similar services; and (4) any other relevant factors, including those listed in the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Id. at 990. In this case, Plaintiffs request a fee
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award of $207,486.50. The Court finds that amount to be excessive in light of the
evidence provided by Plaintiffs. It therefore reduces the fee request accordingly.
As to the first Dixie State Bank factor, Plaintiffs' fee request represents work
that was actually performed. Plaintiffs' counsel submitted an affidavit with a
detailed thirty-page billing statement and a description of the hourly rates for each
attorney and staff on the statement. And Defendants do not contest that the hours
submitted were in fact actually worked.
With respect to the second factor, some of the work detailed in counsel's
billing statement was in aid of motions or claims that were not successful. The
Court will therefore reduce the fee award to exclude fees incurred litigating those
claims and motions. Plaintiffs' initial complaint alleged twelve claims for relief.
Defendants immediately filed a motion to dismiss, asking the Court to dismiss all
but the first and ninth claims. After briefing, Plaintiffs stipulated to dismiss the
seventh claim, and after argument, the Court granted the motion as to the third
and fourth claims.6 Because Plaintiffs failed to prevail on three of the twelve claims
in their complaint, the Court reduces the fee award for drafting the Complaint and
responding to the motion to dismiss by 25%.
Plaintiffs also failed to prevail on a motion for more definite statement, a
motion to file a second amended complaint, and a motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiffs also filed and then withdrew a motion to interplead funds. The Court
thus declines to award Plaintiffs any fees for those motions. 7
Finally, some of Plaintiffs' claims were dismissed at trial on a directed verdict
motion. But the Court finds that those claims were so factually intertwined with
the claims upon which Plaintiffs prevailed that the Court cannot reasonably

Plaintiffs also stipulated that the twelfth claim, which was a claim for punitive damages, was more
properly asserted as a remedy than a claim for relief. The claim was thus dismissed, but the remedy
remained, and the Plaintiffs in fact succeeded in obtaining punitive damages. The Court therefore
does not discount Plaintiffs' fees for the dismissal of the punitive damages claim.
7 Defendants also filed a motion for summary judgment that was argued simultaneously with
Plaintiffs' motion. Plaintiffs' successfully defended against Defendants' motion. The Court thus
awards Plaintiffs half their fees for time spent preparing for and attending the hearing on the
motions for summary judgment.
6

11
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separate out the fees spent only on the dismissed claims. The Court thus does not
reduce any of Plaintiffs fees for trial.
The Court finds that the remaining work performed by Plaintiffs was
reasonably necessary to the successful litigation of their case. The five-day trial
involved claims of fraud, undue influence, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and
interference with an expected inheritance that had been strongly contested over
three years. Plaintiffs successfully defended their case against a motion to dismiss
and motion for summary judgment and ultimately prevailed on both the core of
their claims and a punitive damages claim. Given the length and complexity of the
case and the time necessary to prepare and try the claims, the hours spent by
counsel are reasonable.
According to Plaintiffs' billing records, the total time spent litigating
unsuccessful claims and motions was 42.05 hours. When that rate is multiplied by
the individual billing rates of the various attorneys and staff who performed the
work, the fee reduction amounts to $13,746.50. The Court thus reduces the
$207,486.50 in fees sought by Plaintiffs to $193,740.00.
The Court must also consider whether the hourly billing rates claimed by
Plaintiffs are consistent with the rates customarily charged in the locality for
similar services. The majority of the work on Plaintiffs' case was performed by
Matthew Evans, who bills $335-$360 an hour. Neither side has provided any
evidence as to whether this is a customary rate in Salt Lake County for litigation of
this sort. But the Court is aware that Mr. Evans is a shareholder at a large law
firm and has over twenty years of experience in litigation. The Court is also aware
that $360 is within the customary range for an attorney of Mr. Evans skill and
experience. The Court thus finds Mr. Evans' hourly rate to be reasonable
Plaintiffs' billing records also include work by others at Mr. Evans' law firm.
The brief description in paragraph six of Mr. Evans' affidavit does not provide the
Court with any information about whether these individuals are attorneys or staff
or their level of experience and skill. Without such information, the Court cannot
determine whether the rates at which they are billed are appropriate. It is the
moving party's burden to establish that the fees sought are reasonable, including
12
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that the billing rates are customary for the locality and services. See Dixie State
Bank, 764 P.2d at 988 ("[A]n award of attorney fees must be supported by evidence
in the record.") The Court accordingly declines to award fees for work performed by
the others listed in paragraph six of Mr. Evan's affidavit.
According to the information provided in paragraph six, those others billed
fees totaling $43,408.00. The Court thus reduces Plaintiffs' fee award from
$193,740.00 to $150,332.00.s
Lastly, the Court must consider any other relevant factors. Neither party
cites any other factors. And the Court will simply note that an award of
$150,332.00 in fees is not unreasonable for three years of litigation that culiminated
in a five-day jury trial.
Plaintiffs also ask this Court to award $58,882.92 in costs. They support that
request with an attachment to Mr. Evans' affidavit itemizing their costs. Those
costs include postage and copying expenses, process serving fees, a transcript fee,
travel expenses, and expert witness fees.
Utah Code 75-7-1004(1) authorizes the Court to award "costs and expenses,
including reasonable attorney's fees." But that section does not define "costs and
expenses." Plaintiffs devoted no effort in their briefing to elucidating which costs
and expenses, other than attorney's fees, are recoverable under section 1004(1).
They also made no effort to distinguish between costs under section 1004(1) and
costs under Rule 54(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. As already stated, this Court
will not assume the burden of research and writing the parties' arguments. The
Court thus declines to award costs and expenses, other than attorney's fees, under
section 1004(1) and instead awards costs only under Rule 54(d).
Rule 54(d)(l) awards costs to the prevailing party. But the costs allowed are
not simply general litigation costs. Rather, costs are narrowly defined as "fees that
are paid to the court, fees that are paid to witnesses, costs that are authorized by
statute, and costs incurred in taking depositions, subject to the limitation that they
8

Paragraph six of the fee affidavit describes ranges of fees for some people, presumably because their billing rate
changed over the course of the litigation. Because Plaintiffs did not identify which rate was billed for which hours,
the Court simply used the highest for each person rate when reducing fees.
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were taken in good faith and appear to be essential for the development and
presentation of the case." Giusti u. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, ii 80, 201
P.3d 966.
In this case, Plaintiff seeks costs far in excess of what is allowed under the
prevailing definition of costs. Plaintiff seeks thousands of dollars in costs for
postage, travel, copying, trial exhibits, and compensation for expert witnesses.
Such litigation expenses are not taxable under rule 54(d) as costs to the Defendants.
See Stevensen 3rd East, LC v. Watts, 2009 UT App 137, ~. 63, 210 P.3d 977 (listing
nontaxable costs such as trial exhibits, photocopying costs, and any amount paid
over a statutory amount for witnesses or travel). The Court thus awards costs only
for the process service fees and the transcript fee claimed in Plaintiffs' affidavit.
Those costs amount to $837.50.
V

The Court did not err in refusing to bifurcate the trial, and Defendants
cannot show that decision prejudiced them. Defendants also have not shown that
the punitive damage award was excessive. Defendants' motion for a new trial is
therefore DENIED.
Plaintiffs are awarded attorney's fees of $150,332.00 and costs of $837 .50.
Plaintiffs shall file a judgment that conforms with the jury's verdict and this ruling.
DATED this \

7~day of November, 2017.
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District Court Clerk

Matthew N. Evans (7051)
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500
mevans(@rqn.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Shellie Biesele and Melodie Jacobsen

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ORDER AND JUDGMENT AWARD ING
DAMAGES, ATTORNEY'S FEES, AND
COSTS IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS
SHELLIE BIESELE AND MELODIE
JACOBSEN AGAINST DEFENDANTS
MAY HARRIS AND JODY MATTENA

SHELLIE BIESELE and MELODIE
JACOBSEN
Plaintiffs,
V.

JODY MATIENA and MAY HARRIS,
Defendants.

Civil No. 140902798
Judge: Matthew Bates
JURY DEMANDED
(TIER 3)

The Court held a jury trial on May 1-5, 2017 in the above-referenced matter. Plaintiffs
Shellie Biesele ("Biesele") and Melodie Jacobsen ("Jacobsen") (collectively "Plaintiffs") were
represented by Matthew N. Evans.

Defendants Jody Mattena ("Mattena") and May Harris

("Harris") (collectively the "Defendants") were represented by Edward Munson and Angus
Edwards.

Based upon the jury's verdict at the end of the trial and the Court's post trial

Memorandum Decision addressing motions filed by Defendants and Plaintiffs dated November
17, 2017 and good cause, the Court hereby enters the following Order and JUDGMENT:
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1. Plaintiffs' Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs is granted as
set forth in the Memorandum Decision of the Court dated November 17,
2017.
2. Defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict Regarding
Punitive Damages is DENIED as set forth in the Memorandum Decision
dated November 17, 2017.
3. Concerning claims related to funds in the name of Royalene Thomas at the
time of her passing located at Morgan Stanley, a Judgement is entered in
favor of Plaintiffs against Harris on claims for conversion, breach of
fiduciary duty, and intentional interference with expected inheritance in
the amount of $197,064.54.
4. Concerning Plaintiffs' claims of lack of testamentary capacity by
Royalene Thomas and undue influence on Royalene Thomas by
Defendants, the jury found in favor of Plaintiffs on both issues.

A

Judgement is also entered in favor of Plaintiffs against Harris on claims
for conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and intentional interference with
expected inheritance in the amount of $35,019.16.
5. A Judgment is also entered against Harris as a result of the jury's award of
punitive damages in the amount of $308,555.46. Pursuant to Utah Code
Ann§ 78B-8-201(3) in any case where punitive damages are awarded, the
first $50,000.00 of the punitive damages judgment is awarded in favor of
Plaintiffs and the remaining amount of $258,555.46 is to be divided
equally between the State of Utah and Plaintiffs. However any judgment
2
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amount belonging to the State of Utah shall not be collectible until the
Judgment for compensatory damages, attorney's fees, costs, interest and
the initial $50,000.00 punitive damage judgment in favor of Plaintiffs is
paid in full. Any collection on the remaining punitive damages award will
be shared equally by Plaintiffs and the State of Utah.
6. Concerning claims related to funds in the name ofRoyalene Thomas at the
time of her passing located at Morgan Stanley, a Judgement is entered in
favor of Plaintiffs against Mattena on claims for conversion, breach of
fiduciary duty and intentional interference with expected inheritance in the
sum of$197,064.54.
7. Concerning Plaintiffs' claims of lack of testamentary capacity and undue
influence on Royalene Thomas by Defendants, the jury found in favor of
Plaintiffs on both issues. A Judgement is therefore also entered in favor of
Plaintiffs against Mattena on claims for fraud, conversion, breach of
fiduciary duty, and intentional interference with expected inheritance in
the amount of $76,471.60.
8. A Judgment is also entered against Mattena as a result of the jury's award
of punitive damages in the amount of $308,555.46. Pursuant to Utah
Code Ann § 78B-8-201(3) in any case where punitive damages are
awarded, the first $50,000.00 of the punitive damages judgment is
awarded in favor of Plaintiffs and the remaining amount of $258,555.46 is
to be divided equally between the State of Utah and Plaintiffs. However
any judgment amount belonging to the State of Utah shall not be
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collectible until the Judgment for compensatory damages, attorney's fees,
costs, interest and the initial $50,000.00 punitive damage judgment in
favor of Plaintiffs is paid in full. Any collection on the remaining punitive
damages award will be shared equally by Plaintiffs and the State of Utah.
9. Prejudgment interest is awarded to Plaintiffs against Harris at the rate of
2.85% beginning on April 3, 2013 on the compensatory damages award as
set forth in paragraphs 1 and 2 above in the amount of $232,083.70 and
continuing until the date of entry of this Judgment. As of November 30,
2017, the interest accrued is $30,842.04.
10. Prejudgment interest is awarded to Plaintiffs against Mattena at the rate of
2.85% beginning on April 3, 2013 on the compensatory damages and as
·set forth in paragraphs 4 and 5 above in the amount of $273,806.14 and
continuing until the date of entry of this Judgment. As of November 30,
2017, the interest accrued is $36,385.42.
11. As awarded by the Court in its Memorandum Decision dated November
17, 2017, Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs in
pursuing this action against

Mattena and Harris in the amount of

$150,332.00 as of May 17, 2017 and costs in the amount of $837.50.
12. The total amount of the award and Judgment against Harris as of
November 30, 2017 for compensatory damages and prejudgment interest
is $262,925.74. Interest shall continue to accrue in the amount of $18.12 a
day until this Judgment is entered by the Court.
13. The total amount of the award and Judgment as of November 30, 2017 for
4
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compensatory damages and prejudgment interest against Mattena is
$310,191.56. Interest shall continue to accrue on the principle amount in
the amount of$21.37 per day until this Judgment is entered by the Court.
14. The total amount of judgment for punitive damages against Harris in favor
of Plaintiffs is $179,277.73.
15. The total amount of judgment for punitive damages against Mattena in
favor of Plaintiffs is $179,277.73.
16. The total amount of judgment for punitive damages against Mattena in
favor of the State ofUtah is $129,277.73.
17. The total amount of judgment for punitive damages against Harris in favor
of the State of Utah is $129,277.73.
18. Pursuant to Utah Code section 78B-8-20H3)(d). the State of Utah shall
not be entitled to collect on any judgment until payment of all
compensatory damages, attorneys' fees, court costs, pre and post judgment
interest and the initial $50,000.00 in punitive damages awarded against
Mattena and Harris is paid to Plaintiffs. Once those amounts are collected
and paid, the State of Utah and Plaintiffs will share in collection of any
and all further amounts until all amounts under this Judgment are paid.
19. Plaintiffs are also entitled to post-judgment interest at the prevailing rate
of 2.27% until the entire judgment amounts set forth above are paid in full
or otherwise satisfied throttgh postjttclgmeat remeclies flflcl,lor eolleetioa.
20. Plaintiffs are also entitled to augment this Judgment against Mattena and
Harris by an award of attorney's fees and costs incurred subsequent to
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May 17, 2017 relating to legal work on this case including any post trial
motion briefing or opposition briefs, requests for release of funds, the
preparation of this Judgment and any other legal issues that arise, any
appeal, or in enforcing this Judgment and/or collecting on said Judgment.
Plaintiffs may augment this Judgment by submitting an Affidavit of
Attorney's Fees and Costs in accordance with Rule 73 of Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
21. Plaintiffs flfe entitled to feeeive all funds en aeposit with the Court iH the

amouHt ef $349,858.93 te satisfy part of this JuagmeHt against Mattena
and Haffis. The clerk ef the eeurt shall release saicl :fi.mds to PJaiHtiffa'
counsel upon delh·ery ofthis Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
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** In accordance with the Utah State District Courts £-filing Standard No. 4, and
URCP Rule 10(e), this Order does not bear the handwritten signature of
the Judge, but instead displays an electronic signature at the upper
right-hand comer of the first page of this Order.**
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 4th day of January, 2018, I electronically filed the foregoing

ORDER AND JUDGMENT AWARDING DAMAGES, ATTORNEY'S FEES, AND
COSTS IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS SHELLIE BIESELE AND MELODIE JACOBSEN
AGAINST DEFENDANTS MAY HARRIS AND JODY MATTENA with the Clerk of the
Court using the Utah Trial Court/ECF system which sent notice to the following:
J. Angus Edwards
Bruce Wycoff
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaimants
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
aedwards@ioneswaldo.com
bwycoffr@.joneswald.com

Isl Angelica Torres

1414937
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Matthew N. Evans (7051)
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P .C.
3 6 South State Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500
mevans(a).rqn .com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs Shellie Biesele and Melodie Jacobsen

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SHELLIE BIESELE and MELODIE
JACOBSEN
Plaintiffs,
V.

JODY MATTENA and MAY HARRIS,
Defendants.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT MAY
HARRIS' RULE 59 MOTION TO ALTER
OR AMEND JUDGMENT OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, FOR NEW TRIAL;
MOTION TO STAY EXECUTION OF
ORDER AND JUDGMENT AND
DETERMINATION OF BOND
AMOUNT, IF ANY; AND GRANTING IN
PART PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO
RELEASE FUNDS ON DEPOSIT WITH
THE COURT IN THE AMOUNT OF
$174,924.01
Civil No. 140902798

~

Judge: Patrick Corum
JURY DEMANDED
(TIER 3)

Plaintiffs Shellie Biesele and Melodie Jacobsen's (collectively "Plaintiffs") Motion to
Release Funds on Deposit with the Court came before the Court via oral argument on February
28, 2018. Defendant May Harris' ("Harris") Rule 59 Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment or in
(i)

the Alternative, for New Trial and Motion to Stay Execution of Order and Judgment and
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Determination of Bond Amount, If Any also came before the Court the oral argument on
February 28, 2018. Plaintiffs were represented by Matthew Evans. Harris was represented by
Jeffrey Oritt. Based upon the papers filed by the parties, oral argument, the reasons set forth by
the Court at oral argument and good cause the Court hereby Orders as follows:
I. Harris' Rule 59 Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment or in the Alternative,
for New Trial is DENIED.
2. Harris' Motion to Stay Execution of Order and Judgment and
Determination of Bond Amount, If Any is also DENIED.
3. Plaintiffs' Motion to Release Funds on Deposit with the Court is
GRANTED in part DENIED in part. Upon entry of this Order by the
Court, funds on deposit with the Court belonging to Harris in the amount
of$ I 74,924.0 I shall immediately be released to Plaintiffs' counsel. After
release by the Clerk of the Court of the Harris funds as identified in this
paragraph, the remaining funds on deposit with the Court belonging to
Jody Mattena shall remain on deposit pending further legal proceedings.

** In accordance with the Utah State District Courts E-filing Standard No. 4, and
URCP Rule I 0(e), this Order does not bear the handwritten signature of
the Judge, but instead displays an electronic signature at the upper
right-hand comer of the first page of this Order.**
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:
COHNEKINGHORN

ls/Jeffrey R. Oritt (signed with permission by Matthew N Evans}
Je:ffrey R. Oritt
Attorneys for Defendant May Harris
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 8th day of March, 2018, I electronically filed the foregoing

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT MAY HARRIS' RULE 59 MOTION TO ALTER OR
AMEND JUDGMENT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR NEW TRIAL; MOTION TO
STAY EXECUTION OF ORDER AND JUDGMENT AND DETERMINATION OF
BOND AMOUNT, IF ANY; AND GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO
RELEASE FUNDS ON DEPOSIT WITH THE COURT IN THE AMOUNT OF
$174,924.01 with the Clerk of the Court using the Utah Trial Court/ECF system which sent
notice to the following:
J. Angus Edwards
Bruce E. Wycoff
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH, P.C.
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
aedwards@ioneswaldo.com
bwycoff@joneswaldo.com
Attorneys for Defendant Jody Mattena
Jeffrey R. Oritt
COHNEKINGHORN
111 East Broadway, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
j oritt@cohnekinghom.com
Attorneys for Defendant May Harris
Jacob H.B. Franklin
Sean D. Reyes
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
clo 4130 State Office Building
P.O. Box 141001
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-1001
j frank Iin@agutah.gov
Attorneys for the Office of State Debt Collection

Isl Angelica Torres
4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
March 09, 2018 01 :43 PM
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

03495
4 of 5

1445669

03496
March 09, 2018 01 :43 PM Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5of5

ADDENDUMG

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CV2026 Punitive damages. Introduction.

In addition to compensatory damages, [name of plaintiff] also seeks to recover punitive damages
against [name of defendant]. Punitive damages are intended to punish a wrongdoer for
extraordinary misconduct and to discourage others from similar conduct. They are not intended
to compensate [name of plaintiff] for [his][her][its] loss.
Punitive damages may only be awarded if [name of plaintiff] has proven by clear and convincing evidence
that [name of defendant]'s conduct:
(1) was [willful and malicious]; or,
(2) was [intentionally fraudulent]; or,
(3) manifested a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others,
including [name of plaintiff].
"Knowing and reckless indifference" means that (a) [name of defendant] knew that such conduct would, in a
high degree of probability, result in substantial harm [to another] [to property]; and (b) the conduct must
be highly unreasonable conduct, or an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high
degree of danger or harm would be apparent to a reasonable person.
[The committee was unable to reach a working definition for "willful and malicious conduct." For cases
discussing these terms, please see Committee Note 1.]
[The committee was unable to reach a working definition for "intentionally fraudulent." For cases discussing
these terms, please see Committee Note 2.]
[Punitive damages are not awarded for mere inadvertence, mistakes, errors of judgment and the like, which
constitute ordinary negligence.]
[Some of the questions on the Special Verdict form will ask if [name of plaintiff] has proved by clear and
convincing evidence that [name of defendant]'s conduct (a) was [willful and malicious] [intentionally
fraudulent], or (b) manifested a knowing and reckless indifference and disregard of [name of plaintiff]'s
rights. If you answer "yes" to any of these questions, I will then give you further instructions.]

References
Utah Code § 78B-8-201(1)(a) (West 2014).
Westgate Resorts v Consumer Protection Group, LLC, 285 P.3d 1219, 1222-1223 (Utah 2012).
Daniels v. Gamma W. Brachytherapy, LLC, 2009 UT 66, 221 P.3d 256.
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003).
Hall v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 959 P.2d 109 (Utah 1998).
BMW of N. Am. Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996).
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1991).
Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1988)
Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R. Co., 749 P.2d 660 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)
Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80, 84 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983).
Bundy v. Century Equipment, Inc., 697 P.2d 754, 759 (Utah 1984).

MUJI 1st Instruction
27.20

Committee Notes

1. "Willful and malicious" conduct has not yet been well defined under Utah law, but several
cases discuss what it could mean. For example, Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R. Co., 749
P .2d 660 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) discusses whether actual malice is required for punitive damages
or whether implied malice is sufficient. See also Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988)
and Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P .2d 80, 84 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (discussing whether actual malice
is required). Clayton v. Crossroads Equip. Co., 655 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1982) refers to non-Utah
case law to define "willful or malicious" conduct (emphasis added). And State v. Larsen, 865
P.2d 1355, n. 3 (Utah 1993), discusses what "willful" means. In the non-punitive damages
context, Chang v. Soldier Summit Development, 1999 UT App 27 and Golding v. Ashley Cent.
Irrigation Co., 793 P.2d 897, discuss "willful misconduct".
2. "Intentionally fraudulent" has not been defined by Utah case law. Counsel may review
CV1801 (Elements of Fraud) and CV1809 (Intent) for a working definition and relevant case
law.
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3. The committee was divided on whether the last two paragraphs (in brackets) of this instruction
should be given.
4. The statute requires bifurcation in all cases where punitive damages are sought at trial and
evidence of wealth is introduced. The first phase will resolve the question of whether the plaintiff
is entitled to punitive damages for the conduct alleged. If the jury determines that the plaintiff is
so entitled, there will be a second phase. The second phase may include evidence of the
defendant's wealth or financial condition (Section 78B-8-201(2)), with the jury answering only
the question of what amount of punitive damages to award.
5. The committee did not feel that there is adequate legal direction to determine which punitive damages
instructions should be given in the first phase and which should be given if there is a second phase.
However, one option would be for 2026 (and/or 2033 and 2034) to be read in the first phase, with the
remainder to be read during any second phase.

CV202 7 Amount of punitive damages.

Now that you have decided to award punitive damages, you must determine the amount. Punitive
damages should be the amount necessary to fulfill the two purposes of punitive damages: to
punish past misconduct and to discourage future misconduct. Your decision should not be
arbitrary. The amount must be reasonable and bear some relationship to [name of plaintiff]'s
harm. Whether or not to award a specific amount or any amount of punitive damages is left
entirely up to you.
References
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 426 (2003).
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. 532 U.S. 424, 440-42 (2001).
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 580-83 (1996).
Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 811 (Utah 1991).

MUJI 1st Instruction
27.20

Committee Notes

The Utah Supreme Court has opined regarding the ratios that apply in determining whether a
punitive damage award is excessive. ''The general rule to be drawn from our past cases appears
to be that where the punitives are well below $100,000, punitive damage awards beyond a 3 to I
ratio to actual damages have seldom been upheld and that where the award is in excess of
$100,000, we have indicated some inclination to overturn awards having ratios ofless than 3 to
I." Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 811 (Utah 1991).
The Crookston Court did not provide guidance on whether the presumptive ratios should be
disclosed to the jury. The case law regarding presumptive ratios has been in the context ofpostverdict motions addressed to the judge, and the committee felt that it did not provide guidance
with regard to whether the ratio should be disclosed to the jury.

CV2028 Punitive damages and harm to other people.

In determining the amount of punitive damages, you may award punitive damages for the
purpose of punishing [name of defendant] only for [harm] [attempted harm] [damage] to [name
of plaintiff]. You may not award punitive damages for the purpose of punishing harm or
attempted harm to other people.
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References
Westgate Resorts v Consumer Protection Group, LLC, 285 P.3d 1219, 1222-1223 (Utah 2012).

MUJI 1st Instruction
27.20

CV2029 Factors to consider in determining the amount of damages.

In detennining the amount of damages, you may also consider any evidence regarding the
following: (1) the wealth or financial condition of [name of defendant]; (2) the nature of the
alleged misconduct; (3) the facts and circumstances surrounding such conduct; (4) the effect of
[name of defendant]'s conduct on [name of plaintiff]; (5) the probability of future reoccurrence
of the misconduct toward [name of plaintiff] or others; (6) the relationship of the parties; and (7)
the amount of compensatory damages awarded.

References
Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 811 (Utah 1991). The "harm to others" Crookston
factor number 4 has been modified. Outside conduct or harm to others may now only be used to assess
reprehensibility. See Westgate Resorts v Consumer Protection Group, LLC, 285 P.3d 1219, 1222-1223 (Utah
2012).

CV2030 Reprehensibility.

In detennining the amount of punitive damages that should be awarded, you should consider the
reprehensibility of [name of defendant]'s conduct. Greater reprehensibility may justify a higher
punitive damage award while lesser reprehensibility may justify a lower amount.

References
Westgate Resorts v Consumer Protection Group, LLC, 285 P.3d 1219, 1222-1223 (Utah 2012).
Philip Morris v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
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CV2031 Reprehensibility. Similar Conduct Toward Other People.

When determining the degree ofreprehensibility, you may consider evidence of similar conduct
by [name of defendant] toward other people who are not in this lawsuit; however, I caution you
that this evidence is to be considered only to detennine reprehensibility. The actual harm to other
people is not the measure of punitive damages in this case.
References
Westgate Resorts v Consumer Protection Group, LLC, 285 P.3d 1219, 1222-1223 (Utah 2012).
Philip Morris v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
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